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In a model with housing collateral, the ratio of housing wealth to human wealth shifts the
conditional distribution of asset prices and consumption growth. A decrease in house prices
reduces the collateral value of housing, increases household exposure to idiosyncratic risk, and
increases the conditional market price of risk. Using aggregate data for the US, we ﬁnd that
a decrease in the ratio of housing wealth to human wealth predicts higher returns on stocks.
Conditional on this ratio, the covariance of returns with aggregate risk factors explains up
to eighty percent of the cross-sectional variation in annual size and book-to-market portfolio
returns. Regional risk-sharing patterns for US metropolitan areas lend direct support to the
housing collateral channel. In times with a high housing collateral ratio, consumption growth
is more strongly correlated across regions. Time-variation in the degree of risk-sharing induced
by house price changes sheds new light on the consumption correlation puzzle.
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Scientiﬁc Research..1 Introduction
We introduce housing into Lucas’ (1978) endowment economy. The households in our economy
trade contingent claims to insure against labor income risk. These claims have to be fully backed
by the value of their housing stock. An increase in the value of housing wealth relative to human
wealth, the housing collateral ratio, allows for more risk sharing and decreases the premia on risky
assets.
When the collateral constraints do not bind, our model collapses to the standard consumption-
based capital-asset-pricing model of Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979). That model prices only
aggregate consumption growth risk. It has been rejected by the data (e.g. Hansen and Singleton
(1983)). Our paper addresses two shortcomings of the consumption-based capital-asset-pricing
model (CCAPM).
First, because US aggregate consumption growth is approximately i.i.d., the CCAPM implies
a market price of risk that is approximately constant. However, in the data, stock market returns
are predictable. This suggests that the market price of aggregate risk varies over time (e.g. Fama
and French (1988), Campbell and Shiller (1988), Ferson, Kandel and Stambaugh (1987), Whitelaw
(1997), Lamont (1998) and Campbell (2000) for an overview).
Second, the covariance of asset returns with consumption growth explains only a small fraction
of the variation in the cross-section of stock returns of ﬁrms sorted in portfolios according to size
and value (book-value to market-value) characteristics (Fama and French (1992)). In response to
this failure, Fama and French (1993) drop the connection between the stochastic discount factor and
consumption growth and directly specify the stochastic discount factor as a linear function of the
market return, the return on a small minus big ﬁrm portfolio, and a high minus low book-to-market
ﬁrm portfolio. The empirical success of this three-factor model has motivated recent research on
the underlying macroeconomic sources of risk for which their factors proxy (e.g. Bansal, Dittmar
and Lundblad (2002), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b), Santos and Veronesi (2001) and Cochrane
(2001) for an overview).
The failure of the CCAPM reﬂects its imposing of perfect consumption insurance. In the
data, there is strong empirical evidence against full consumption insurance at diﬀerent levels of
aggregation: at the household level (e.g. Attanasio and Davis (1996), Cochrane (1991b) and Nelson
(1994)’s comment on Mace (1991)), the regional level (e.g. Hess and Shin (1998) and Ostergaard,
Sorensen and Yosha (2002)) and the international level (e.g. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992)).
Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2002) ﬁnd evidence for a degree of consumption insurance that
varies over time.
Our paper addresses these issues in the context of an endowment economy, but follows Alvarez
and Jermann (2000) in relaxing the assumption that contracts are perfectly enforceable. Depending
on whether they have enough collateral, households sometimes cannot trade away all of their labor
income risk. As in Lustig (2000), we allow households to ﬁle for bankruptcy. The new feature of our
model is that each household owns part of the housing stock. Housing provides both utility services
and collateral services. When a household chooses not to honor its debt repayments, it loses all
1housing collateral but its labor income is protected from creditors. Defaulting households regain
immediate access to credit markets. In equilibrium, all state-contingent promises are fully backed
by the value of the housing stock. The lack of commitment gives rise to participation constraints
whose tightness depends on the abundance of housing collateral. We measure this by the housing
collateral ratio: the ratio of collateralizable housing wealth to non-collateralizable human wealth.
These constraints are motivated by the empirical importance of housing collateral. In the US,
two-thirds of households own their house. For the median-wealth homeowner, home equity repre-
sents seventy percent of household net worth (Survey of Consumer Finance, 1998). Residential real
estate wealth accounts for thirty-one percent of total household net worth and eighty-two percent
of non-ﬁnancial assets, while home mortgages make up sixty-eight percent of household liabilities
(Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve, average for 1952-2001). Currently, the value of residential wealth
is equivalent to the total household stock market wealth ($13 trillion) and the mortgage market is
the largest credit market in the US ($5.6 trillion).
Relative to the benchmark model with fully-enforceable contracts, our theory modiﬁes the
stochastic discount factor. It adds a new component which is a function of the cumulative La-
grange multipliers on the households’ participation constraint (the Pareto-Negishi weights). The
household’s Pareto-Negishi weight is increased whenever its constraint binds. Hence, the weights
summarize the individual history of binding collateral constraints. We consider two variations of the
model. In a ﬁrst economy with frictionless rental markets, perfect aggregation obtains and the new
component of the stochastic discount factor is the growth rate of a cross-sectional moment of the
Pareto-Negishi weight distribution. In a second economy, households live in diﬀerent regions and
housing services can only be traded among households within a given region. The new component
is the change in the Pareto-Negishi weight of the unconstrained household(s) relative to the other
households in the economy. In either case, when a large fraction of households is constrained the
new component is high. This mechanism increases the volatility of the stochastic discount factor
relative to the benchmark model.
The key feature of the model is that the housing collateral ratio moves endogenously. It shifts
the conditional distribution of household consumption growth between two benchmark economies.
When the housing collateral ratio is low, households more frequently run into binding collateral
constraints. To prevent a household from defaulting today, its current and future consumption
must increase as a share of aggregate consumption. The economy is constrained in how much risk-
sharing it can implement. In the limit, when the housing collateral disappears altogether, no risk
sharing is possible and the economy is in autarky. In contrast, when the housing collateral ratio
is high, the collateral constraints never bind; the economy achieves full insurance, like an economy
without commitment problems.
The equilibrium Pareto-Negishi weight processes are functions of the primitives of the model:
the preferences, the household endowment process, and the aggregate endowment process. In a
companion paper, we obtain a recursive formulation and numerically solve for the equilibrium
Pareto-Negishi weight processes for an economy with two agents (Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh
2(2002)). However, for a large number of agents we run into the curse of dimensionality.
This paper takes a diﬀerent route. Our empirical strategy is directly to specify a stochastic
process for the Pareto-Negishi weights in a way consistent with the theory. The aim is to link the
unobservable weight processes to the data on housing collateral. Theory disciplines this approach
in two ways. The weight process is known in the polar cases of autarky and perfect commitment.
We adopt a speciﬁcation that allows the housing collateral ratio to shift the conditional distribution
of household consumption growth between the polar cases.
On the basis of this speciﬁcation, we impose a linear factor structure on the weight process
that connects our model to the linear factor models in the empirical ﬁnance literature. Our model
is a conditional version of the CCAPM with the housing collateral ratio as the conditioning vari-
able. The housing collateral ratio summarizes the investor’s time-varying information set. In the
ﬁrst economy, the risk of binding collateral constraints is captured by the housing collateral ratio
and the interaction terms of the housing collateral ratio and the aggregate sources of risk. With
non-separable preferences over housing services and consumption, the aggregate risk sources are
consumption growth and rental price growth. In the second economy, the constraint risk is captured
by the income and rental price growth of the unconstrained region relative to the other regions,
and both terms interacted with the aggregate housing collateral ratio.
Our theory has three testable predictions. First, households demand a larger compensation for
a given amount of aggregate consumption risk in times when the housing collateral ratio is low.
This implies that the housing collateral ratio predicts aggregate stock returns over time. Second,
a particular asset earns a larger risk premium if its returns are more correlated with consumption
growth when the housing collateral ratio is low. Third, the model predicts less consumption in-
surance when the housing collateral ratio is low: consumption growth is more sensitive to income
growth and rental price growth.
We test these three predictions using the following data. First, for the time-series predictability
of returns, we use annual return data for the aggregate US stock market index. We measure the
aggregate stock of housing collateral in three diﬀerent ways: by the value of outstanding mortgages,
by the value of residential real estate (structures and land) and by the value of residential ﬁxed
assets (structures). The housing collateral ratio is measured as the deviation from the cointegration
relationship between the value of the aggregate housing stock and aggregate labor income. Second,
for the cross-sectional exercise, we use twenty-ﬁve size and book-to-market portfolios, and the
value-weighted market return. Third, for the risk-sharing tests, we construct a new panel data set
for US metropolitan statistical areas on consumption, income and house prices.
Table 1 summarizes the predictions of our model and contrasts them with the predictions of
the Lucas-Breeden model. The last column shows the data we use to test them. The ratio of
collateralizable housing wealth to non-collateralizable human wealth is labelled my.
We ﬁnd strong empirical support for each of the predictions. First, in the time series, the housing
collateral ratio does predict stock returns, mainly at lower frequencies. Second, in the cross-section,
our model explains between seventy and eighty percent of the variability in annual returns of the
3Perfect risk-sharing Limited risk-sharing Data
Consumption-CAPM Collateral-CAPM Period
Time-series no return predictability my predicts returns Excess market return and my
Predictability constant price of risk my-varying price of risk (1889-2001)
Pricing Covariance of returns Covariance Aggregate factors (1926-01)
Portfolios with risk factors conditional on my Regional factors (1951-01)
Risk-sharing Corr(∆c;∆y) = 0 Corr(∆c;∆y) Regional data
Across regions lower when my high (1951-01)
Table 1: Predictions and Data for Empirical Exercises.
Fama-French portfolios. This ﬁt is obtained for both variations of the model: the frictionless
economy with aggregate pricing factors tested on aggregate data, and the economy with housing
frictions and regional asset pricing factors tested on metropolitan data. For annual returns, this
matches the empirical success of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and outperforms
other consumption-based asset pricing models (e.g. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b)). Third, we
provide direct evidence for the underlying time-variation in risk-sharing. Using our metropolitan
data set, we reject full consumption insurance. The degree of partial insurance decreases when the
housing collateral ratio is low and varies substantially over time. This time variation in risk-sharing
is direct evidence for the mechanism that drives our model and leads to the asset pricing predictions
implied by it.
We organize the paper as follows. In section 2, we brieﬂy discuss other related literature.
Section 3 describes the environment and characterizes eﬃcient and equilibrium allocations. The
fourth section contains a discussion of our empirical strategy which bridges the gap between theory
and data. Section 5 describes our data and section 6 shows how we measure the housing collateral
ratio. Our empirical ﬁndings are summarized in section 7. Section 8 concludes. Appendix A
contains details of the model, the computational method and the data. The most important ﬁgures
and tables appear in the main text, all others in Appendix B.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is closest in spirit to the work of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b). As in their paper,
we develop a scaled version of the CCAPM. Our state variable my summarizes information about
future returns on housing relative to human capital. It does not contain any direct information on
the future returns on stocks. In contrast, the scaling variable in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) is
the consumption-wealth ratio, which summarizes household expectations about future returns on
the entire market portfolio, including ﬁnancial wealth.
Our model contains three further important features. First, we allow preferences over non-
durable and housing consumption to be separable or non-separable, and we ﬁnd strong empirical
evidence for the collateral eﬀect in either case. In recent work, Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel (2002)
argue that non-separability is important for pricing assets. They consider a representative agent
who consumes nondurables and housing services. Suppose housing services and consumption are
4complements; the agent commands a larger risk premium if returns and rental prices are positively
correlated. They show that this hedging eﬀect increases the explanatory power of the standard
consumption capital asset pricing model for stock and bond returns.
Second, we model the outside option as bankruptcy with loss of all collateral assets. In Kehoe
and Levine (1993), Krueger (2000), Krueger and Perri (2002), and Kehoe and Perri (2002) limited
commitment is also the source of incomplete risk-sharing across US households and across countries
respectively. In contrast, the outside option upon default is exclusion from future participation in
ﬁnancial markets.
Third, our paper features a general equilibrium economy with aggregate uncertainty and endoge-
nous house price ﬂuctuations. In contrast, life-cycle and portfolio choice models such as Fernandez-
Villaverde and Krueger (2001), Cocco (2000), Yao and Zhang (2002) , Flavin and Yamashita (2002)
posit an exogenous price process for housing.
3 Setup
This section starts with a complete description of the environment in section 3.1. Section 3.2 sets
up a planner problem. In this environment, households cannot commit ex ante to a consumption
plan. This constrains the feasible allocations. We provide a complete characterization of these
allocations using stochastic Pareto-Negishi weight processes. Section 3.3 introduces markets and
oﬀers a decentralization of these planner allocations. We show that the growth rate of an aggregated
Pareto-Negishi weight process drives the consumption growth of the oﬀ-corner households and these
households price the random payoﬀs. Rental markets are frictionless in section 3.3. In 3.4 we modify
the problem and introduce housing market frictions.
3.1 Environment
We consider an endowment economy with N regions. Household i lives in region i and cannot move.
There is a continuum of identical households in each region. These households are inﬁnitely-lived.
Uncertainty s is an event that follows a Markov process. These events take on values on a
discrete grid S. We use st to denote the history of events. St denotes the set of possible histories
up until time t: ¼(stjs0) denotes the probability of a history st conditional on st:




t=0 : There are two types of com-
modities in this economy: a consumption good and housing services. The consumption good cannot
be stored. We let
©
ciª
denote the stream of consumption and we let
©
hiª
denote the stream of
housing services of household i.
































are sequences of taste shocks. The


















Ã > 0 converts the housing stock into a service ﬂow. The elasticity of substitution between c and
h is (1¡¾)¡1. Housing and non-durable consumption are complements if 1¡° ¡¾ > 0. Otherwise










The aggregate endowment of the consumption good is denoted feg:




aggregate endowment of housing services is denoted fhtg: The aggregate endowments are the sum








t(st) = ht(st); 8st;t ¸ 0:
Commitment Technology A plan ¾i =
©
ci;hiª
is a complete description of household i0s
















The household cannot commit ex-ante to a plan. At each node st, it faces a participation
constraint:
Ui(¾i)(st) ¸ ·i





is the continuation value of the household upon default. For now, we take ·i
t(st) as
given.
A household can choose to exercise its option to default on the plan in any state of the world.
When it does so, its individual history is erased. Therefore we refer to this option as the anonymity
option. From that node onwards, the household’s future consumption plan only depends on the
history of the economy.
The household cannot be excluded from the contract, because the planner cannot keep track of
the household after it exercises the anonymity option. However, the planner can observe and seize
1The preferences belong to the class of homothetic power utility functions of Eichenbaum and Hansen (1990).




. After exercising the anonymity option, the household loses its claim
























i=1 is said to be immune to the threat of bankruptcy if the allocation satisﬁes
the participation constraint 1 for each household and at all nodes of the event tree.
3.2 Planner Problem
The planner computes the constrained eﬃcient allocations. In this environment, the participation
constraints depend on the shadow price of consumption and housing services in diﬀerent states of
the world. To compute these allocations, the planner solves a ﬁxed point problem.
Let ` denote the N £ 1¡vector of initial Pareto-Negishi weights. The planner maximizes a
weighted sum of the household’s utilities subject to a participation constraint (1) in each node st












subject to the resource constraint in (2) for each st and subject to the participation constraint for




denote the sequence of multipliers on the participation constraints imposed on house-
































subject to the resource constraint in (2) for each st. We deﬁne »i
t(st) to be household i’s cumulative
Lagrange multiplier:
»i







7We refer to »i




stochastic process. If a household participation constraint binds, its weight increases to a cutoﬀ
level that depends only on s, the current event. If the constraint does not bind, its weight remains
unchanged. This imputes limited memory to the allocations: a household’s individual history is
erased whenever it switches to a state with binding constraints.
Shadow Prices and Component Planner Problem We decompose the planner problem into
a separate component planner problem for each household. Using this component planner problem,
we can recover the household’s Pareto-Negishi weight process for each household, starting at any
arbitrary node st (Atkeson and Lucas (1992)).
Let f˜ ¹g denote the Lagrange multiplier process for the resource constraint for the consumption
good in st. ˜ ¹t(st) is the planner’s shadow price of consumption at node st. We will refer to this
object as the shadow state price for consumption. Similarly, let f˜ ½˜ ¹g denote the Lagrange multiplier
process for the resource constraint for the housing services in st.




























˜ Πst [fdg] denotes the shadow value of a dividend stream fdg, computed with f˜ ¹g as the state












. The variable ˜ Wi
t(st) is net shadow
wealth, net of labor income. At time 0, a household’s shadow wealth is the value of its housing
endowment: ˜ Wi
0(s0) = ˜ Πs0
£©
˜ ½iÂiª¤
. The vector of initial Pareto-Negishi weights ` is determined
such that the shadow value of each household’s consumption claim equals the shadow value of its
initial endowment of housing services and labor income. ˜ Wi
t(st) captures the eﬀect of an individual
household’s history on its consumption plan. The shadow cost constraints (3) ensure that the
planner satisﬁes its resource constraints in all histories.
The planner solves the following ﬁxed point problem. For an initial guess of shadow state prices,
he computes the Pareto-Negishi weight processes for each household and the implied allocation.
The allocation gives rise to a new guess for the shadow state prices. The planner iterates on these
two steps until convergence.
Participation Constraint By exercising the anonymity option, the household erases its indi-
vidual history and sets ˜ Wi
t(st) = 0. The value of the anonymity option is the optimum of the













8subject to the participation constraints at all future nodes and such that the cost constraint in (3)
is satisﬁed for ˜ Wi
t(st) = 0 (Lustig (2000)).
Because ·i
t(st) is monotonically increasing in ˜ Wi
t(st); the participation constraints (1) can be
stated as a non-negativity restriction on net wealth:
˜ Wi









; 8st;t ¸ 0 (4)
The anonymity option depends on the shadow state prices f˜ ¹;˜ ½g.
Solving the planner problem requires conjecturing shadow state prices, computing the outside
options and the new, implied shadow prices until a ﬁxed point is reached.
Constrained Optimality At the constrained Pareto-optimum, there is a mapping from the
multipliers at st to consumption of both commodities. We refer to this mapping as the risk-sharing
rule.





t(st)) = ˜ ¹t(st)
Marginal utility growth is determined by the growth of a household’s individual weight, relative to
































The equalization implies that the shadow state price of rental services is pinned down by the ratio
of the aggregate housing endowment to the aggregate consumption endowment:






Let us abstract from taste shocks for now. A household’s optimal consumption share and
















t (st) ht(st); (5)
where »a






°. When a household switches to a
state with a binding constraint, its consumption share experiences a sudden jump up. Everywhere
else, its consumption share is drifting downwards.




i=1 and the aggregate resource constraint multipliers f˜ ¹;˜ ½g:
We use ma
t+1 to denote the IMRS of an agent who consumes both of the aggregate endowments.






, the growth rate of the






The growth rate of the shadow state price for consumption consists of two parts: (1) the intertem-
poral marginal rate of substitution ma
t+1 of the representative agent2 and (2) the growth rate gt+1 of
the aggregate Pareto-Negishi weight process »a
t. When many households are severely constrained
in a state tomorrow, that state’s shadow price increases, because the unconstrained households
experience high marginal utility growth.
Collateral Supply The shadow price of housing services f˜ ½g determines how much risk-sharing
the planner can achieve. When the shadow price of housing services increases, the left hand side of
the participation constraints (4) increases and the anonymity option becomes less appealing. The
shadow value of the aggregate housing stock, ˜ Πst [f˜ ½hg], measures the collateral the planner has








˜ Πst [f˜ ½hg]
˜ Πst [feg]
(7)
It measures the tightness of the participation constraints. If this ratio is zero, no risk sharing is
feasible. If the shadow relative price of housing services increases in a persistent way, this ratio
increases and the planner can sustain more risk sharing.
These constrained eﬃcient allocations can be decentralized using results by Alvarez and Jermann
(2000). To do so, we introduce markets for all the assets and commodities.
3.3 Markets
We describe the trading arrangements in sequential markets, the household’s problem and deﬁne
a competitive equilibrium. We then argue that the equilibrium with sequential trading can be
mapped into an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in which all trading takes place at time zero. In a ﬁrst
step we assume that markets for housing services are frictionless. In a second step (section 3.4) we
relax this assumption.
2The intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of the representative agent is a function of the aggregate con-




















10The ﬁnancial markets are complete. Spot markets for housing services are frictionless. All prices
are quoted in units of the consumption good. Households trade a complete set of contingent claims
at(st;s0) in forward markets. at(st;s0) is a promise to deliver one of unit the consumption good if
event s0 is realized in the next period. These claims trade at a price qt(st;s0). Households also trade
shares !t(st) in the aggregate housing tree at a price ph
t (st). In the spot market, households trade
housing services ht(st): The price of a unit of housing services is ½t(st) in units of the consumption
good.









; for all st;s0: (8)
All of a household’s state-contingent promises are backed by the cum-dividend value of its holdings
in the aggregate housing tree. At the start of the period, the household purchases goods in the









































solve household i’s maximization problem, (2) the markets for
the consumption good and the housing services clear and (3) the market for contingent claims clears,
(4) the shares in the aggregate housing tree sum to one.
The equilibria in the economy with sequential trading are equivalent to Kehoe and Levine
(1993) equilibria, if the equilibrium interest rates are high enough (Alvarez and Jermann (2000)).
These Kehoe-Levine equilibria are essentially Arrow-Debreu equilibria and hence the underlying
allocations are (constrained) eﬃcient. Appendix A.1 provides the details.
To show the equivalence, we deﬁne the market state price ¹t(st) as the product of the Arrow
prices for the events along a path st:
¹t(st) = qt¡1(st¡1;s0)qt¡2(st¡1):::q0(s1);
where ¹t(st) is the price at time 0 of a unit of consumption to be delivered at node st.
By iterating forward on the collateral constraints in (8), substituting for the time 0 budget




, the sequence of collateral constraints











; 8st;t ¸ 0: (9)
We use Πst [fdg] to denote the market value of a dividend stream computed with market state
prices f¹g.
Proposition 2. If the interest rates are high enough, the equilibrium allocations are constrained
eﬃcient (Alvarez and Jermann (2000)).
We can decentralize the constrained eﬃcient allocations obtained from the planner’s problem
by equating the market state prices and the shadow state prices:
¹t(st) = ˜ ¹t(st) and ½t(st) = ˜ ½t(st)
The constrained eﬃciency follows from two facts. First, substituting the shadow state prices for
¹t(st) in (9) reproduces the planner’s participation constraints, at each node st. Second, the ﬁrst
order conditions in the planner problem are identical to the ﬁrst order conditions of the household
in a competitive equilibrium.
Stochastic Discount Factor The solution to the planner problem delivers a list of Pareto-
Negishi weight processes, one for each household. The aggregate weight process f»a
tg ﬁxes con-
sumption growth for the unconstrained households and these households price payoﬀs in that state
of the world.
In this complete markets setting, there exists a unique and strictly positive stochastic process












for any return process
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Rjª
: fmg is the stochastic discount factor process. It is the product of
the standard representative agent stochastic discount factor ma
t+1 and the growth rate gt+1 of the






t+1 is the IMRS of an agent who consumes the aggregate endowments. We refer to the growth
rate gt+1 as the aggregate weight shock. The aggregate weight shock is large if many households
are severely constrained. If none of the households is constrained, the shock is unity.
If the number of households N is arbitrarily large, we can deﬁne an aggregate event zt that
describes the current aggregate endowment growth rate and the current myt. In this environment,
Lustig (2001) shows that the aggregate shock fgg depends only on the history of aggregate shocks
zt. This history tracks changes in the distribution of weights across households.
123.4 Housing Market Frictions
We introduce a second economy. The environment is unchanged, except for the tradeability of
housing services. In the second economy, the planner cannot reallocate housing services across
households of diﬀerent types. In the decentralization, households can only trade housing services
in the spot market with other households in region i.




t(st); 8i; 8st;t ¸ 0: (12)
This gives rise to a diﬀerent shadow price for housing services in each region i : ˜ ½i
t(st):
Markets and Equilibrium Household i buys shares !
i;j
t (st) in a real estate fund for household






t(st) in each period from household j to household i.


















In equilibrium, each household has its own rental price ½i
t(st). Housing market clearing requires
that (12) holds with equality for all states.
Stochastic Discount Factor In this environment, diﬀerent households face diﬀerent rental
prices and the aggregation result breaks down, except when preferences for housing and consump-
tion are separable.
We provide a decomposition of the household’s IMRS in a common component and a household-














t+1 to denote the unconstrained household between st and st+1. The log stochastic
discount factor can be approximated by a common component and a household-speciﬁc weight
shock:




where loga mt+1 is the IMRS evaluated at the average consumption growth ∆a logct+1 and average
rental price growth ∆a log½t+1. The weight shock is the growth rate of the unconstrained region’s
relative Pareto-Negishi weight.
This weight shock is large if many households are severely constrained. If none of the households
is constrained, it is zero. The weight shocks are driven by my, the ratio of aggregate housing
collateral wealth to aggregate human wealth.
134 Back-Solving
For given shadow state prices, the stochastic Pareto-Negishi weights determine the constrained ef-
ﬁcient allocations. The allocations determine new shadow state prices, so that the planner solves a
ﬁxed-point problem. To compute the Pareto-Negishi weights, the planner takes a particular calibra-
tion of the household endowment process, the aggregate endowment process and the preferences as
inputs. The Pareto-Negishi weights are the outputs of the planner problem. This is called “forward
solving”. In a companion paper we characterize the solution to the planner problem recursively
and solve numerically for the equilibrium Pareto-Negishi weight processes for an economy with two
agents (Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh (2002)). Kehoe and Perri (2002) also follow a forward solving
strategy in a two-agent world.
To estimate the model in this approach, we would have to ﬁx a particular calibration of the
model, compute the weights and compute the relevant asset pricing moments. We could then
iterate on these steps to ﬁnd the underlying parameter vector that minimizes the distance between
the asset pricing moments for the model and for the data. This vector includes the parameters
governing the individual endowment processes. For a large number of households, we run into the
curse of dimensionality and the problem becomes computationally intractable.
In this paper we take a diﬀerent route. We directly parameterize the outputs of the planner
problem: the stochastic Pareto-Negishi weight process. We move the inputs, in particular, the un-
derlying endowment processes, to the background and focus our eﬀorts on linking the unobservable
weight processes to the data. Theory strictly guides the speciﬁcation. This approach is a version
of “back-solving” (e.g. Sims (1990)).
We impose a linear factor structure on the weight process. As a result, the back-solving strategy
delivers a linear pricing model:
mt+1 = ¡µFt+1;
where µ is a vector of constants and Ft+1 is a vector of factors. This connects our model to the
linear factor model tradition in the empirical ﬁnance literature.
In the ﬁrst economy, with frictionless rental markets, we specify a stochastic process for the
aggregate weight shock. This delivers a factor model that only depends on aggregate factors (section
4.1). In the second economy, with housing market frictions, we specify the regional weight shocks.
This delivers a factor model that depends on regional factors and the housing collateral ratio (4.2).
In either case, the linear factor model gives rise to the ¯-representation described in 4.3, which
is estimated in section 7.
4.1 Aggregate Factors
In the ﬁrst economy, housing markets are frictionless and the aggregate weight shocks are driven
only by aggregate variables.
We use Fa
t+1 = (∆logct+1;At∆log½t+1) to denote the vector of aggregate factors: consumption




a = (Υc;Υ½) to denote the unconditional mean of the aggregate factors.
To derive a linear pricing model mt+1(myt;Fa





for the aggregate weight shocks fgg . The housing collateral ratio myt is the conditioning variable.
Deﬁnition. In the ﬁrst economy, a complete description of the linear pricing model mt+1(myt;Fa
t+1)





and (2) a process
for the housing collateral ratio myt+1(myt;Fa
t+1).
The Housing Collateral Ratio fmyg is speciﬁed as an autoregressive process whose innovations
are a linear combination C of the innovations to Fa
t+1:





The innovations to the aggregate factors are the structural innovations in our model.
Aggregate Weight Shocks The ratio my governs how much consumption can be transferred
from good states to bad states by the planner. If this ratio is high enough, the planner can sustain
perfect risk sharing. On the other hand, if this ratio is low enough, the planner cannot improve
upon the autarchic outcome. The collateral ratio shifts the conditional distribution of tomorrow’s
Pareto-Negishi weights.
If the aggregate factors Fa are i.i.d., the weight shock gt+1 only depends on myt+1 (Lustig
(2001)). In general, the aggregate weight shock can depend on the entire aggregate history of the
economy (Fa)
t+1. If the constraints bind enough, the history dependence dies out rather quickly.
We chose to impose a Markov structure on the aggregate weight shocks fgg.








B1 + B2∆logct+1 + B3At∆log½t+1
¢
+ "t+1; (16)
where B is a vector of constants and, by the Markov assumption, Et [myt+1"t+1] =





We can test for history dependence by including Fa
t¡k for k ¸ 0 on the right hand side.
Linear Factor Model The factor model for the weight shocks and the autoregressive process






t+1), the stochastic discount factor in (11) can be stated in terms of aggregate
factors Fa
t+1 and the state variable myt: mt+1(myt;Fa
t+1). A ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of
this expression delivers our linear factor model:
mt+1 ¼ ±(1 ¡ µaFa
t+1 ¡ µcFc
t+1 ¡ °B1CF
a ¡ ° (B2;B3)Fa
t+1Fa0
t+1C0 ¡ °"t+1); (17)
15where the representative agent factors Fa



















The constraint factors interact the aggregate factors Fa
t+1 with the state variable myt. We im-











= 0 for k;l = 1;2, where
˜ R
e;j
t+1 denotes the (mean-zero) unexpected returns.3 This assumption and the law of iterated expec-
tations imply that the quadratic terms in Fa will drop out in the unconditional beta-representation














Case 1: Separable Preferences When utility is separable, the equity risk premium is
determined by the conditional covariance of its returns with consumption growth and a state-



















If B2 is zero, the expression collapses to the standard CCAPM of Lucas (1978) and Breeden
(1979). The market price of consumption risk is constant and equal to the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion °. In contrast, our theory predicts an increase in the size of the aggregate weight
shock when aggregate consumption growth is low, driven by an increase in idiosyncratic risk.
Consumption growth has an eﬀect on the liquidity shock: B2 < 0. When my is low, the market
price of consumption risk is high.
Case 2: Non-Separable Preferences Non-separability introduces a second covariance in
the risk premium equation: the covariance with rental price changes. Under complementarity of
nondurable consumption and housing (Á > 0), households want to hedge by investing in assets that
deliver high returns when consumption is scarce, that is when the rental price of housing services
increases. This hedging risk is the focus of recent work by Piazzesi et al. (2002).
If B3 is zero, the market price of rental price risk is constant and equal to the degree of
complementarity between consumption and housing services in the utility function Á. In contrast,
if B3 < 0, the market price of rental price risk is high when my is low.
3Conditional joint normality of returns and aggregate factors is suﬃcient for this assumption.
164.2 Regional Factors
The second economy has housing market frictions. We use regions as the unit of analysis and













denote the vector of regional factors: income growth and scaled
rental price growth for region i in deviation from the cross-region mean.
To derive a linear pricing model mt+1(myt;Fa
t+1;Fi
t+1), we propose a factor model for the






. The housing collateral ratio myt is the conditioning
variable.
Deﬁnition. In the second economy, a complete description of the linear pricing model
mt+1(myt;Fa
t+1;Fi






and (2) a process for the aggregate housing collateral ratio myt+1(myt;Fa
t+1).
Consumption Euler Equation Regional consumption is a non-linear function of the Pareto-
Negishi weights. This function satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition of the planner problem and the
resource constraint. We deﬁne the log consumption share log(ˆ ci
t) as the deviation of log consumption
for agent i from the cross-region mean. Using the planner’s ﬁrst order condition we approximate






























t is a taste shock residual and Ai
t is the expenditure share of housing services.4 This is an
approximation because the nonlinear term in the utility function is expanded around ½i
t = ½i
t¡1.
The details of this derivation are in appendix A.2.
Region-speciﬁc consumption growth is driven by region-speciﬁc weight shocks, region-speciﬁc
rental price changes weighted by the housing expenditure share Ai and taste shocks for housing
and non-durable consumption summarized in º.
Regional Weight Shocks There are two polar cases for which the Pareto-Negishi weight shock
is known explicitly : (1) the autarkic outcome and (2) the perfect risk-sharing outcome. The
housing collateral ratio shifts the allocations between these two outcomes.
We use mymin to denote the housing collateral ratio below which only the autarkic allocations
can be sustained, and we use mymax to denote the collateral ratio above which perfect risk-sharing
can be sustained.
First, when myt < mymin, the planner chooses the autarkic allocations and region-speciﬁc con-













t = (1 ¡ °)∆ˆ b
i;c











































Second, when myt > mymax, the planner can implement the perfect risk-sharing allocations and














The housing collateral ratio shifts these weight shocks between the upper bound and the lower
bound. We restrict this shifting eﬀect of my to be linear. We propose this simple factor model for






















where the coeﬃcients ¯1 and ¯2 are functions of the housing collateral ratios mymax and mymin:
¯1 =
mymax
mymax ¡ mymin; ¯2 =
1
mymax ¡ mymin:
Equation (20) expresses the region-speciﬁc weight shocks as a linear function of region-speciﬁc
income growth, rental price growth and the interaction terms with the housing collateral ratio.








Fi¢t. For an unconstrained region, the weight shock cannot depend on its
own history because all unconstrained regions equate their marginal utility growth. Because we
impose the same weight shock process (20) for constrained and unconstrained regions, the Markov
structure of the unconstrained weight shocks implies a Markov structure for the constrained weight












. By virtue of this symmetry, the
relative regional weight processes, Gi
t+1(myt+1;Fi
t+1) are Markov.








(15), the stochastic discount factor in (14) can be stated in terms of aggregate factors Fa
t+1; the
regional factors Fi
t+1 and the state variable myt: mt+1(myt;Fa
t+1;Fi
t+1). We use i¤
t+1 to denote the





. A ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation delivers







































































with associated factor loadings
µa = (°;Á)
µc = (°¯1;¡°½¯2;Á¯1;¡Á½¯2)



































= 0 .5 This assumption and the law of iterated expecta-




















Constraint Risk The household is compensated for shocks to the Pareto-Negishi weights that
are correlated with returns. This collateral constraint risk is captured by the four constraint factors.
Case 1: Separable Preferences When utility is separable, the equity risk premium is
determined by the conditional covariance of returns with average consumption growth and with



























The latter risk factor has a state-varying market price of risk. If ¯1 and ¯2 are zero, only risk
associated with average consumption growth is priced. When ¯1 > 0 a decrease in the unconstrained
region’s income share decreases her relative weight shock. This increases the equity risk premium.







is high when my is low.
Case 2: Non-Separable Preferences When utility is non-separable, the equity risk pre-
mium is also determined by the conditional covariance of returns with average rental price growth
and with the rental price growth of the unconstrained region. If ¯1 and ¯2 are zero, only rental price
risk associated with average rental price changes is compensated. When Á > 0 (complementarity)
and ¯1 > 0, our theory predicts a decrease in the unconstrained region’s weight shock when her
relative rental price growth is low. This increases the equity risk premium. If Á > 0 and ¯2 > 0,










is high when my is low.






















To summarize, the discount factor is decomposed into a representative agent and a constraint
component:
mt+1 = ¡µFt+1; (23)













¢0 is a vector of representative agent and constraint pricing factors. The aggregate and
regional models each have a distinct set of factors. Each factor has a macroeconomic interpretation.
If µ were time-varying, the conditional orthogonality conditions in (10) would not imply un-
conditional orthogonality conditions. Here, the vector of constraint factors contains the original
factors scaled by the housing collateral ratio myt. myt is the conditioning variable that summarizes
the investor’s information set. The stochastic discount factor contains the conditioning informa-
tion through the scaled constraint factors. The model (23) can be tested using the unconditional








Using the deﬁnition of the risk-free rate and the covariance, the unconditional factor model in













= ˜ ¸˜ ¯
j
; (25)
where ¯ Rf is the average risk-free rate, ˜ ¯
j










and ˜ ¸ is a transformation of the parameter vector ˜ µ: ˜ ¸ = ± ¯ Rf˜ µCov
³
˜ F; ˜ F0
´
.6 The unconditional
¯-representation in (25) is the restriction we test in section 7.2.
5 Data
In the empirical section (section 7) we use three sets of variables: ﬁnancial variables, aggregate
macroeconomic variables and regional macroeconomic variables. All variables are annual and for
the United States.
5.1 Financial Data
In a ﬁrst time-series exercise we just use the return on the aggregate stock market. In a second
exercise we use a cross-section of stock portfolios, sorted by size and value characteristics.
6Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) point out that ˜ ¸ does not have a straightforward interpretation as the vector of
market prices of risk. The market prices of risk ¸ depend on the conditional covariance matrix of factors which is
unobserved.
20Market Return The market return is the cum-dividend return on the Standard and Poor’s
composite stock price index. The market return is expressed in excess of a risk-free rate, the
annual return on six-month prime commercial paper. The returns are available for the period
1889-2001 from Robert Shiller’s web site.
Size and Book-to-Market Portfolios We use twenty-ﬁve portfolios of NYSE, NASDAQ and
AMEX stocks, grouped each year into ﬁve size bins and ﬁve value (book-to-market ratio) bins. Size
is market capitalization at the end of June. Book-to-market is book equity at the end of the prior
ﬁscal year divided by the market value of equity in December of the prior year. Portfolio returns are
value-weighted. We also include the market return Rvw, the value-weighted return on all NYSE,
AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. We refer to this set of 26 test assets as T1. All returns are expressed
in excess of an annual return on a one-month Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates). The
returns are available for the period 1926-2001 from Kenneth French’s web site and are described
in more detail in Fama and French (1992). The ﬁrst column of table 15 shows mean and standard
deviation for the 26 excess returns in T1.
5.2 Aggregate Macroeconomic Data
Price Indices Aggregate rental prices ½t are constructed as the ratio of the CPI rent component
ph
t and the CPI food component pc
t. Data are for urban consumers from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics for 1926-2001. The price of rent is a proxy for the price of shelter and the price of food
is a proxy for the price of non-durables. We use the rent and food components because the shelter
and non-durables components are only available from 1967 onwards. Two-thirds of consumer
expenditures on shelter consists of owner-occupied housing. The BLS uses a rental equivalence
approach to impute the price of owner-occupied housing. Because ½t is a relative rental price, our
theory is conceptually consistent with the BLS approach. We also use the all items CPI, pa
t, which
goes back to 1889. All indices are normalized to 100 for the period 1982-84.
Housing Collateral We use three distinct measures of the housing collateral stock HV : the
value of outstanding home mortgages (mo), the market value of residential real estate wealth (rw)
and the value of the owner-occupied and tenant occupied residential ﬁxed assets (fa). The ﬁrst
two time series are from the Historical Statistics for the US (Bureau of the Census) for the period
1889-1945 and from the Flow of Funds data (Federal Board of Governors) for 1945-2001. The last
series is from the Fixed Asset Tables (Bureau of Economic Analysis) for 1925-2001. The rw and
fa-series diﬀer by the value of land. Appendix A.5 provides detailed sources. Real per household
variables are denoted by lower case letters. The real, per household housing collateral series, hv,
is constructed using the all items CPI from the BLS, pa, and the total number of households, N,
from the Bureau of the Census.
21Consumption and Income Consumption is non-durable consumption C, measured by expen-
ditures on food and apparel. Food and apparel are the only two items for which we have data
prior to 1930. This is unproblematic because the correlation between the growth rate in real per
household consumption on food and apparel and the growth rate in real per household consumption
of non-durables and services excluding housing services is 0.97 for the period 1930-2001.
The housing expenditure share, A, is the ratio of rent expenditures to the sum of expenditures
on rent, food and apparel.
The income endowment in the model corresponds to an after-government income concept; it in-
cludes net transfer income. Aggregate income Y is labor income plus net transfer income. Nominal
data are from the Historical Statistics of the US for 1926-1930 and from the National Income and
Product Accounts for 1930-2001. Consumption and income are deﬂated by pc and pa and divided
by the number of households N.
5.3 Regional Macroeconomic Data
To estimate the model with housing frictions (section 7.2.3) and to estimate the consumption Euler
equation (section 7.3), we construct a panel data set for US regions. In particular, we collect data
for the thirty largest metropolitan areas. Thirteen of the regions are metropolitan statistical areas
(MSA). The other seventeen are consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSA), comprised of
adjacent and integrated MSA’s. The regions combine for 47 percent of the US population. The
metropolitan data are annual for 1951-2001. Most CMSA’s did not exist at the beginning of the
sample. For consistency we keep track of all constituent MSA’s and construct a population weighted
average for the years prior to formation of the CMSA (see table 10 in appendix A.5).
Price Indices The CPI all items index p
i;a
t , the rent component p
i;h
t and the food component
p
i;c
t are available at the metropolitan level (BLS).






for the Bay Area, St.-Louis and the US average. The Bay Area and St.-Louis have the most
divergent rental prices among all regions in our sample. The plot reveals a large and slow-moving
common component in relative rental prices.
Consumption and Income Inter-regional risk-sharing studies use retail sales data as a proxy
for non-durable consumption (DelNegro (1998) and references therein). We collect retail sales data
from the annual Survey of Buying Power published by Sales & Marketing Management (S&MM).
Non-durable consumption for region i, Ci
t, is total retail sales minus hardware and furniture sales
and vehicle sales. From the same source we obtain the number of households in each region, Ni
t.
Real per household consumption ci is nominal non-durable consumption deﬂated by p
i;c
t and divided
by the number of households Ni
t.
Because we have very limited data for the housing expenditure share at the regional level, we
assume that the regional expenditure share equals the aggregate one: Ai
t = At; 8t.
22Disposable personal income Y i
t is also from S&MM. Disposable personal income consists of labor
income, ﬁnancial market income and net transfers. The latter two contain a potentially important
insurance component. Therefore we also use labor income plus net transfers from the Regional
Economic Information System.
Appendix A.5 compares non-durable retail sales and disposable income with aggregate con-
sumption and income data (Table 12), with metropolitan non-durable consumption data from the
Consumption Expenditure Survey (BLS, 1986-2000, Table 13) and with metropolitan labor income
data plus transfers from the REIS for 1969-2000 (Table 14). The correlation between the growth
rates of aggregate real non-durable consumption per household and the metropolitan average of real
non-durable retail sales per household is 0:77. Also, our metropolitan data are highly correlated
with the metropolitan data from the BLS and the REIS.
There are no complete CPI data for Baltimore, Buﬀalo, Phoenix, Tampa and Washington.
There are no complete consumption and income data for Anchorage. Elimination of these regions
leaves us with annual data for 23 metropolitan regions from 1951 until 2001. This is the regional
data set we use in sections 7.2.3 and 7.3.
6 Measuring the Housing Collateral Ratio
This section measures the new state variable, the housing collateral ratio my. my is deﬁned as
the ratio of collateralizable housing wealth to non-collateralizable human wealth. Human wealth is
unobserved. Following Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a), we assume that the non-stationary compo-
nent of human wealth H is well approximated by the non-stationary component of labor income
Y . In particular, log(Ht) = log(Yt) + ²t, where ²t is a stationary random process. The assumption
is valid in a model in which the expected return on human capital is stationary (see Jagannathan
and Wang (1996) and Campbell (1996)).
Cointegration Log, real, per household real estate wealth (loghv) and labor income plus trans-
fers (logy) are non-stationary. According to an augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the null hypothesis
of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 1 percent level. This is true for all three measures of housing
wealth (hv = mo;rw;fa).
If a linear combination of loghv and logy, log(hvt) + $log(yt) + Â , is trend stationary, the
components loghv and logy are said to be stochastically cointegrated with cointegrating vector
[1;$;Â]. We additionally impose the restriction that the cointegrating vector eliminates the deter-
ministic trends, so that log(hvt)+$log(yt)+#t+Â is stationary. A likelihood-ratio test (Johansen
and Juselius (1990)) shows that there is one cointegration relationship between housing collateral
and labor income plus transfers. Table 2 reports the results of this test and of the vector error














23The K error correction terms are included to eliminate the eﬀect of regressor endogeneity on
the distribution of the least squares estimators of [1;$;#;Â]. The housing collateral ratio my is
measured as the deviation from the cointegration relationship:
myt = log(hvt) + ˆ $log(yt) + ˆ #t + ˆ Â:
The OLS estimators of the cointegration parameters are superconsistent: They converge to
their true value at rate 1=T (rather than 1=
p
T). The superconsistency allows us to use the housing
collateral ratio my as a regressor without need for an errors-in-variables standard error correction
(see section 7).
The housing collateral ratios for the three housing collateral measures are labelled mymo; myrw
and myfa. The constructed housing collateral ratio is stationary. The null hypothesis of a unit
root is rejected at the ﬁve percent level for mymo and myfa and at the ten percent level for myrw.
For the common sample period 1925-2001, the correlation between mymo and myrw is 0.85, 0.75
between mymo and myfa and 0.83 between myrw and myfa.

















myfa $ # Â LHR K
1925-2001 -.907






Table 2: Cointegration Relationship. The second through fourth columns show coeﬃcient estimates for the cointe-
gration relationship. Signiﬁcance at the 5% level is denoted by a ¤, signiﬁcance at the 1 % level by ¤¤. The ﬁfth column shows
the likelihood ratio statistic of the Johansen cointegration test. It assumes a linear trend in the data, a constant and a trend in
the cointegration relationship. The 5% critical value is 25.32, the 1% critical value is 30.45. The last column shows the number
of error correction terms in the regression. They are chosen on the basis of a likelihood ratio test. The ﬁrst panel is for the
log real value of outstanding mortgages per household mo. The second panel is for the log real market value of real estate per
household rw. The third panel is for the log real value of owner- and tenant-occupied housing for non-farm persons fa. All
cointegration relationships are estimated with log real per capita labor income plus net transfers income y. The cointegration
relationship is estimated for the entire sample period (1889-2001 for mo and rw and 1925-2001 for fa) and for the post-war
subsample. Coeﬃcient estimates for Dk are not reported.
Figure 1 displays my between 1889 and 2001. All three series exhibit large persistent swings,
especially in the two decades between 1925-45. They reach a maximum deviation in 1932-33.
Mortgage debt is 83 percent above its joint trend with human wealth. Land and structures and
residential ﬁxed asset wealth are 40 percent and 47 percent above their joint trends with human
wealth. The series reach a minimum in 1944, when mymo is ¡:80, myrw is ¡:43 and myfa is
¡:29.
The second row of each panel of Table 2 reports error-correction estimations for the subsample
post-1946. Figure 2 shows the cointegration residuals my for that post-war period. Residential
wealth and ﬁxed assets residuals myrw and myfa are plotted against the right axis, mortgage
residuals mymo against the right axis. Housing collateral wealth ﬂuctuates within 30 percent
24Figure 1: Housing Collateral Ratio 1889-2001. Measured by outstanding home mortgages (mo), non-farm resi-
dential wealth (rw) and residential ﬁxed asset wealth (fa) relative to human wealth (y)
































































Figure 2: Housing Collateral Ratio 1946-2001.

















































































below and above the long-run trend with human wealth.
7 Empirical Evidence of the Collateral Eﬀect
We address two empirical failures of the CCAPM. In section 7.1 we provide evidence that the
housing collateral ratio predicts stock returns. This suggests that the market price of risk is not a
constant but a function of my. Second, in contrast to the CCAPM, our model can help account
for a large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in size and book-to-market portfolio returns
(section 7.2). The failure of the CCAPM model is not surprising because it relies on perfect
25consumption insurance. In section 7.3 we provide evidence that consumption growth is imperfectly
correlated across US metropolitan areas. Furthermore, we show that cross-sectional correlation of
consumption growth is higher when the housing collateral ratio my is high. This time variation
in risk-sharing is direct evidence for the mechanism that drives our model and underlies the asset
pricing results.
7.1 Time-Series Predictability
The model generates predictable variation in risk premia on stocks. The reward for risk is higher
when housing collateral is scarce. We ﬁnd empirical support for this negative relationship.
Many ﬁnancial and macroeconomic variables have forecasting power for the market return.7 A
subset of those variables, such as the investment-capital ratio (Cochrane (1991a)), the consumption-
wealth ratio (Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a)) and the labor income - consumption ratio (Santos
and Veronesi (2001)), are macroeconomic variables. These variables are correlated with or forecast
the business cycle. In contrast, the housing collateral ratio is a more low-frequency variable. A
spectral decomposition reveals that at least two-thirds of the variation in the housing collateral
ratio is situated at horizons longer than 20 years. The power spectrum in ﬁgure 10 (at the end
of the text) reaches its peak at frequencies below 2¼=20. As for the cyclical properties of my, the
spectrum displays a smaller hump at ¼=4; a frequency associated with a long recession (8 years).
Figure 11 adds NBER recession dates to ﬁgure 1. In many episodes, the collateral ratio increases
until after the start of the recession and only starts to decline near the end.
VAR A vector autoregression provides a ﬁrst window on the data generating process for one-
year excess returns and the housing collateral ratio. We study the response of excess returns to
an innovation to my. Figure 3 shows the negative response of the excess return to an orthogonal
innovation in myfa, the my measure for ﬁxed assets. The initial drop in the equity risk premium is
followed by a further decrease which persists for multiple years.8 The eﬀect is large: A 4 percentage
point innovation to myfa causes a 2.9 percentage point decrease in the equity risk premium. In
1942, myfa declined by 20 percentage points in one year. The impulse response estimates suggest
a 14 percentage point increase in the risk premium. Figures 12 and 13 (at the end of the text)
show a similar pattern for the other two measures of the housing collateral ratio.
Long Horizon Predictability To illustrate the economic eﬀect of return forecastibility over
a longer period, we study long-horizon excess returns. We deﬁne the K-year continuously com-








t equals log(1 + R
vw;e
t ). Figure
7The dividend-price and dividend-earnings ratio, the treasury bill rate, the term spread between long-term gov-
ernment bonds and treasury bills and the default spread between low- and high-grade corporate bonds are ﬁnancial
variables with forecasting power for excess returns. See Cochrane (2001), Ch. 20 for an overview.
8The optimal lag length for the VAR is two years according to the Aikake Information criterion. The covariance
matrix of innovations has small oﬀ-diagonal elements, i.e. their innovations have a small common component.
Therefore, changing the ordering of the variables R
vw;e and my in the VAR does not aﬀect the impulse-responses.
26Figure 3: Response of the One-Year Excess Return to Impulse in Collateral Ratio myfa. The dashed
lines represent one standard error above and below the response graphs, generated by Monte Carlo simulation (5,000 repetitions)





































































4 shows the housing collateral ratio (mymo) and the annualized ten-year excess return. The series
exhibit a negative correlation of ¡0:51. Regressions of the one- to ten-year cumulative stock returns
on the housing collateral ratio (mymo) provide further evidence of predictability.
Figure 4: 10-year Excess Market Return on the Collateral ratio mymo.


































































There are two econometric problems with the ordinary least squares regression:
r
vw;K
t+K = b0 + bmymyt + et+1: (27)
First, because the forecasting variable my is a slow-moving process, the least squares estimator
of the coeﬃcient on my, bLS
my, suﬀers from persistent regressor bias in small samples (Stambaugh
(1999)). Second, because r
vw;K
t+K contains overlapping observations, the standard errors on bLS
my need
to be corrected for serial correlation in the residuals e. Asymptotic corrections as advocated by
Hansen and Hodrick (1980) have poor small sample properties. Ang and Bekaert (2001) ﬁnd that
use of those standard errors leads to over-rejection of the no-predictability null. To address the
27persistent regressor bias and the serial correlation issues we conduct a bootstrap exercise, detailed
in appendix A.3.
The ﬁrst row of table 3 shows the least squares coeﬃcient estimate on my for the period
1889-2001. The fourth row contains the estimates for the postwar period. All coeﬃcients on the
housing collateral ratio are negative: A negative housing collateral ratio predicts high future risk
premia. The R2 of the least-squares regression increases with the horizon, to 54 percent in the
postwar period (second row). The third row in each panel reports the small-sample coeﬃcient
estimates, generated by bootstrap. With few exceptions, the bias is small. At every horizon, the
coeﬃcient estimates remain negative. The fourth row reports the p-value of a two-sided test of no
predictability, generated by bootstrap. It measures the likelihood of observing the least squares
coeﬃcient estimate when returns are in fact unpredictable. For K ¸ 5, there is evidence against
the null-hypothesis at the 10 percent level.
1889-2001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
b
LS
my -.06 -.12 -.17 -.23 -.31 -.39 -.46 -.52 -.56 -.57
R
2 .01 .02 .03 .04 .06 .08 .11 .13 .13 .12
b1 small sample -.06 -.13 -.09 -.17 -.48 -.40 -.34 -.53 -.56 -.56
p-value [:17] [:18] [:28] [:22] [:09] [:05] [:11] [:04] [:05] [:08]
1946-2001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
b
LS
my -.18 -.47 -.80 -1.14 -1.41 -1.69 -2.01 -2.39 -2.68 -2.94
R
2 .03 .08 .19 .27 .30 .33 .39 .46 .50 .54
b1 small sample -.22 -.50 -.79 -.81 -.87 -1.09 -1.80 -2.33 -2.65 -2.81
p-value [:33] [:20] [:17] [:13] [:24] [:26] [:07] [:09] [:06] [:06]





t+K are cumulative excess returns on the value weighted market portfolio over a K-year horizon. The housing collateral
ratio my is mymo. The ﬁrst row reports least squares estimates for bmy. The second row reports the R2 for this regression.
The third row reports small sample coeﬃcient estimates generated by bootstrap (see A.3). The fourth row gives the p-value
of the null hypothesis of no predictability, also generated by bootstrap. The second panel shows results for the postwar period
using the postwar housing collateral ratio mymo.
7.2 Cross-Sectional Results
Size and book-to-market value are asset characteristics that challenge the standard CCAPM. His-
torically, small ﬁrm stocks and high book-to-market ﬁrm stocks have higher returns. In the post-war
period, the size premium has largely disappeared, but the value premium is still prominent. The
CCAPM yields large pricing errors on book-to-market stocks: This is the value premium puzzle.
The new asset pricing factors in our model substantially improve the ﬁt of the cross-section of
returns. The average pricing errors are cut in half. This is the case for both the aggregate (section
7.2.2) and the regional asset pricing model (section 7.2.3). In section 7.2.4, we compare the ﬁt of
our model to other asset pricing models. First we brieﬂy discuss the computational procedure.
7.2.1 Computational Procedure
The coeﬃcient vector µ in equation (24) can be estimated using the Fama and MacBeth (1973)
two-stage regression procedure or the Hansen and Singleton (1982) generalized method of moments







= ˜ ¸˜ ¯
j
. In a ﬁrst time-series stage, for each asset separately, excess returns
are regressed on factors to uncover the ˜ ¯’s. In a second cross-sectional stage, average excess returns
are regressed on the ˜ ¯’s from the ﬁrst stage to obtain the market prices of risk ˜ ¸. Appendix A.4
describes the procedure in more detail.
The regional factor model introduces a new computational issue, not present in the representa-
tive agent framework. The sequence of unconstrained agents fi¤g and the vector µ that minimizes
pricing errors on the cross-section of asset portfolios have to be determined jointly. Appendix A.4
describes a ﬁxed-point algorithm that addresses this issue. The algorithm can be used in any model
in which a shifting subset of agents prices the assets.
7.2.2 Results: Aggregate Asset Pricing Factors
We use aggregate macroeconomic data and the Fama-MacBeth procedure to investigate the ex-
planatory power of the aggregate asset pricing factors in (17) for the cross-section of excess returns
on size and book-to-market portfolios T1.
Table 4 reports the estimates for the market price of risk ˜ ¸ obtained from the second-stage of
the Fama-MacBeth procedure. Below the estimates for ˜ ¸, we report conventional standard errors
and Shanken (1992) standard errors, which correct for the fact that the ˜ ¯’s are generated regressors
from the ﬁrst time-series step. Since all returns are in excess of a risk free rate, according to the
theory, the intercept in the cross-sectional regressions should be zero.
Row 1 shows the standard CCAPM. It explains 15 percent of the cross-sectional variation
in excess returns on the size and book-to-market portfolios. With non-separable preferences, the
change in relative rental prices scaled by the housing expenditure share is an additional asset pricing
factor. The hedging eﬀect increases the R2 to 44 percent (row 2). Rows 3 through 8 investigate
the collateral eﬀect. With separable preferences, the new asset pricing factors are the housing
collateral ratio my and consumption growth scaled by my. The ﬁt improves to 70 - 77 percent for
the respective measures of the housing collateral ratio (rows 3-5). With non-separable preferences,
the interaction term of my with rental price growth is an additional asset pricing factor and the ﬁt
improves slightly (rows 6-8). With conditioning variable myfa, our collateral-CAPM explains 81
percent of the cross-sectional variation in portfolio returns.
The time-invariant market price of consumption risk, predicted by the standard CCAPM, is
overly restrictive. A decrease in the housing collateral ratio increases the market price of consump-
tion risk (row 3-5): We estimate ¸my:c < 0. This time-varying reward for consumption risk is
predicted by the model.
The estimation reveals two weaknesses, which are common to all consumption-based models
(see section 7.2.4 for a comparison with other models). First, the intercept in the cross-sectional
regression, ˜ ¸0 should be zero. Its estimate is positive and signiﬁcant. This suggests the models in
29˜ ¸0 ˜ ¸c ˜ ¸½ ˜ ¸my ˜ ¸my:c ˜ ¸my:½ R2
1 8.28 3.86 15:0
CCAPM (2:39) (2:57) 11.5
[2:68] [3:01]
2 8.15 3.89 -1.44 43:8
Hedging Eﬀect (2:39) (2:57) (:51) 38.9
[3:31] [3:67] [:73]
3 10.21 1.46 .08 -1.53 69:8
Separable Prefs. (2:60) (2:41) (:06) (1:07) 65.6
mymo [3:77] [3:77] [:10] [1:61]
4 8.30 1.96 .05 -.66 72:1
Separable Prefs. (2:38) (2:50) (:04) (:50) 68.3
myrw [3:37] [3:66] [:06] [:74]
5 6.68 1.17 -.01 -.71 77:0
Separable Prefs. (2:25) (2:48) (:02) (:37) 73.8
myfa [3:01] [3:42] [:03] [:52]
6 10.26 2.02 -.81 .07 -1.40 .15 70:3
Non-Separable Prefs. (2:95) (1:85) (:44) (:06) (1:00) (:20) 62.9
mymo [4:32] [2:85] [67] [:10] [1:53] [:31]
7 9.60 4.25 -1.02 .04 -.63 .15 75:0
Non-Separable Prefs. (2:66) (1:92) (:48) (:04) (:48) (:09) 68.7
myrw [4:28] [3:21] [:80] [:07] [:81] [:16]
8 7.68 2.91 -.06 .00 -.71 .18 81:4
Non-Separable Prefs. (2:44) (1:85) (:40) (:02) (:36) (:08) 76.7
myfa [3:94] [3:12] [:67] [:04] [:60] [:14]
Table 4: Cross-Sectional Results with Aggregate Pricing Factors. The asset pricing factors are ∆log(ct+1) in
row 1, ∆log(ct+1) and At∆log(½t+1) in row 2, ∆log(ct+1), myt, myt∆log(ct+1) in rows 3-5 and ∆log(ct+1), At∆log(½t+1),
myt ,myt∆log(ct+1) and mytAt∆log(½t+1) in rows 6-8. The housing collateral variable is mymo in rows 3 and 6, myrw in
row 4 and 7 and myfa in row 5 and 8. The estimation is done using the Fama-MacBeth procedure. The set of test assets is
T1. The sample period is 1926-2001. OLS standard errors are in parenthesis, Shanken (1992) corrected standard errors are in
brackets. The last column reports the R2 and the adjusted R2 just below it.
table 4 do a poor job pricing the risk-free rate. Second, the Shanken standard-error correction is
large. This is because the macro-economic factors have a low sample variance and the size of the
standard-error correction is inversely related to this variability.
As a robustness check, we relax the Markov assumption on the aggregate weight shock fgg.
We allow for history dependence by including an additional lag of the aggregate factors Fa
t in the






. The ﬁt of the cross-sectional
estimation does not improve. We conclude that the Markov assumption on fgg is not too restrictive.
Figure 5 compares the CCAPM and the collateral-CAPM. The left panel plots the average
realized excess return on each of the 26 portfolios in T1 against the return predicted by the standard
CCAPM. It also shows the 45 degree line. This panel illustrates that the CCAPM fails to account
for the variation in excess return across portfolios: The predicted returns spread along a horizontal
line. The right panel, which corresponds to the estimates in row 8 of table 4, shows the returns
predicted by the collateral-CAPM. The size and value portfolios line up along the 45 degree line.
Table 16 (at the end of the text) reports the average pricing errors on each of the 26 portfolios
in T1. Relative to the CCAPM, the collateral-CAPM eliminates the overpricing of growth stocks
30and the underpricing of value stocks. The average pricing error across portfolios is 3 percentage
points for the CCAPM (ﬁrst column, second to last row) but only half as large for the collateral-
CAPM (last column). The errors are comparable in size and sign to the Fama and French (1993)
three-factor model (second column of table 16 and section 7.2.4). The last row of the table shows a
Â2-distributed test statistic for the null hypothesis that all pricing errors are zero. The collateral-
CAPM is the only model for which the hypothesis of zero pricing errors cannot be rejected.9
Figure 5: CCAPM and Collateral-CAPM - Aggregate Pricing Factors. Left Panel: Realized average
excess returns on 25 Fama-French portfolios and the value weighted market return against predicted excess returns by standard





























































































2 = 15% R
2 = 81%
Time-Varying Betas Why does the collateral-CAPM help explain the value premium? In the
model, a stock’s riskiness is determined by the covariance of its returns with aggregate risk factors
conditional on the state variable my. The conditional covariance reﬂects time-variation in risk
premia. If time variation in risk premia is important for explaining the value premium, then stocks
with high book-to-market ratios should have a larger covariance with aggregate risk factors in risky
times, when my is low, than in less risky times, when my is high. This is the pattern we ﬁnd in
the data.
We estimate the risk exposure (the ¯’s) for each of the twenty-ﬁve size and book-to-market
portfolios and the value weighted market return. This is the ﬁrst step of the Fama-MacBeth two-




t+1 = ˜ ¯
j
0 + ˜ ¯
j
c∆logct+1 + ˜ ¯
j
mymyt + ˜ ¯
j
my:cmyt∆logct+1: (28)
Equation (28) allows the covariance of returns with consumption growth to vary with my. For
9Because of the sampling error in the regressors the Shanken correction for the Â
2 test statistics is large. This
correction substantially reduces the test statistic (see A.4). The result that the collateral-CAPM fails to reject the
null hypothesis of zero pricing errors should be interpreted in this light.
31each asset j, we deﬁne the conditional consumption beta as ¯
j
t = ˜ ¯
j
c + ˜ ¯
j
my:cmyt. We estimate
equation (28) and compute the average consumption beta in good states, deﬁned as times in which
my is one standard deviation above zero, and in bad states (risky times) when my is one standard
deviation below zero. Table 17 shows that the high book-to-market portfolios (B4 and B5) have a
consumption ¯ that is large and positive when housing collateral is scarce and negative in times of
collateral abundance. The opposite is true for growth portfolios (B1 and B2).
The left panel of ﬁgure 6 shows that the value portfolios (B4, B5) have a high return and
the growth portfolios (B1, B2) have a low return. The right panel plots realized excess returns
against ˜ ¯
j
my:c, the exposure to the interaction term of the housing collateral ratio with aggregate
consumption growth. Growth stocks in the upper left corner have a low exposure to collateral
constraint risk whereas value stocks have a large exposure. So, value stocks, are riskier than
growth stocks because their returns are more highly correlated with the aggregate factors when
risk is high (my is low) than when risk is low (my is high). Because the estimate of ˜ ¸my:c and ˜ ¯
j
my:c
are negative, value stocks are predicted to have a higher risk premium. The value premium is the
compensation for the risk of binding collateral constraints.
Figure 6: Collateral CAPM: The Value Premium. Left Panel: Realized average excess returns on 25 Fama-French
portfolios and the value weighted market return against excess returns predicted by the collateral-CAPM with myrw. Right




















































When preferences are non-separable, the change in rental prices and its interaction term with
the housing collateral ratio enter as additional regressors in equation (28). Table 18 at the end
of the paper shows the ˜ ¯
vw
-estimates for the value weighted market return. Not only does the
covariance of the market return with consumption growth decrease with my, the covariance with
rental price growth does as well (˜ ¯
vw
my:½ < 0). The ﬁt of the time-series regression improves from ﬁve
to twenty percent once the scaled factors (the interaction terms) are included. This result shows
that the covariance of the aggregate US stock market return with the aggregate risk factors is not
32constant as predicted by the static CCAPM, but varies with my.
7.2.3 Results: Regional Asset Pricing Factors
We use metropolitan macroeconomic data (1951-2001) and the iterative Fama-MacBeth procedure
to investigate the explanatory power of the regional asset pricing factors in (21) for the cross-section
of excess returns on size and book-to-market portfolios T1.
Table 5 displays the estimates for the market prices of risk ˜ ¸. In addition, the table reports the
estimates for the underlying parameter vector ˜ µ implied by the estimates for ˜ ¸.
The R2 of the regressions are 67-72 percent, similar to the ﬁt of the scaled aggregate factor
model in section 7.2.2. We ﬁnd support for the collateral eﬀect in the regional factor model. The
compensation for bearing collateral constraint risk is higher in times of collateral scarcity. The
price of risk associated with the income growth of the unconstrained region decreases with my:
˜ ¸my:ˆ y < 0 and signiﬁcant according to conventional standard errors. Estimates µ4 < 0 and µ1 > 0
imply a positive estimate for ¯2. This is consistent with the collateral eﬀect predicted by the
theory. The interaction term between the housing collateral ratio and the rental price growth of
the unconstrained region has a small and insigniﬁcant price of risk attached to it. Finally and in
contrast with the aggregate factor model, the intercept ˜ ¸0 is no longer statistically diﬀerent from
zero.
The left panel of ﬁgure 7 plots realized excess returns for the twenty-six portfolios in T1 against
the returns predicted by the collateral-CAPM with regional factors (row 3 in table 5). Value ﬁrms
(B4, B5) have a higher exposure to constraint risk in risky times, when my is low, than in good
times, when my is high. The coeﬃcient ˜ ¯my:ˆ y is large and negative for value stocks (right panel).
The opposite is true for growth stocks (B1, B2). This pattern is analogous to the one in ﬁgure 6.
Stocks that pay low returns when the income growth of the unconstrained region decreases demand
a risk premium, because constraint risk is high. In those times housing collateral is extra valuable.
The value premium is a compensation for the fact that value stocks pay low returns in times that
households face a high risk of binding collateral constraint and housing collateral values are low.
The cross-sectional ﬁt does not hinge on a high degree of risk aversion. The implied estimate
for the coeﬃcient of risk aversion is lower than unity: µ1 =0.48, 0.09 and 0.02 in rows 1-3. The
evidence on the degree of complementarity between housing services and consumption, Á, is mixed.
The estimate for µ2 = Á is -0.11 in row 1 but .96 and 1.24 in rows 2 and 3. The former implies
substitutability, the latter two complementarity. The coeﬃcients ˜ ¸ˆ ½ and ˜ ¸my:ˆ ½ are estimated impre-
cisely, so that µ5 and µ6 are uninformative about Á. This conﬁrms previous work which has found
mixed evidence on the sign and magnitude of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
durable (housing) and non-durable consumption.10
10An exception is Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) who reject a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation using aggregate (quality-
adjusted) consumption data on durable goods for the period 1951:1-1983:4. They ﬁnd a point estimate for Á of -1.66.
Many quantitative papers such as Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2001), Cocco (2000) and Yao and Zhang (2002)
assume a unit elasticity, corresponding to Cobb-Douglas preferences.
33˜ ¸0 ˜ ¸c ˜ ¸½ ˜ ¸ˆ y ˜ ¸my:ˆ y ˜ ¸ˆ ½ ˜ ¸my:ˆ ½ R
2
1 4:43 2:32 :58 ¡2:26 ¡4:81 ¡:10 :34 67:4
mymo (3:81) (1:04) (:33) (2:57) (2:57) (:21) (:37) 57.1
[7:02] [1:95] [:63] [4:78] [4:83] [:41] [:70]
￿ :48 ¡:11 :05 ¡:27 :79 :71
2 5:07 :95 :73 ¡1:72 ¡4:81 :10 :04 71:1
myrw (3:87) (:81) (:28) (1:43) (2:13) (:25) (:82) 62.1
[7:26] [1:55] [:55] [2:74] [4:10] [:48] [1:56]
￿ :09 :96 ¡:07 ¡:29 2:61 ¡:76
3 1:61 :82 :81 ¡2:44 ¡5:72 ¡:02 :01 71:8
myfa (3:95) (:81) (:30) (2:27) (3:90) (:45) (:97) 62.9
[7:52] [1:59] [:60] [4:35] [7:50] [:86] [1:87]
￿ :02 1:24 ¡:13 ¡:24 2:26 ¡:59
Table 5: Cross-Sectional Results with Regional Asset Pricing Factors. Results are for the iterative





























. The sequence fi¤
tg is the
sequence of unconstrained metropolitan regions. The coeﬃcient vector µ consists of °, Á, °¯1, ¡°½¯2, Á¯1 and ¡Á½¯2. The
second column gives the zero-¯ return ˜ ¸0. OLS standard errors are in parentheses, Shanken (1992) corrected standard errors
are in brackets. Row 1 is for mymo, row 2 for myrw and row 3 for myfa. The set of test assets is T1. The period is 1952-2001,
the longest period with metropolitan data.
Figure 7: Cross-Sectional returns - Regional Asset Pricing Factors. Left Panel: Realized average excess
returns on 25 Fama-French portfolios and the value weighted market return against predicted excess returns with myfa. Right

















































































Sensitivity Analysis We investigate the robustness of the regional asset pricing results to three
sources of misspeciﬁcation.
First, in the iterative Fama-MacBeth procedure, the region with the largest decrease in Pareto-
Negishi weight is selected to price all assets. Because the weight processes themselves are unob-
servable, the selection is based on our speciﬁcation in equation 20. The speciﬁcation relates the
weight changes to observable changes in the income share and relative rental price. However, the
relationship between the weights and the observables also contains an error term which measures
unobservable preference changes. The error term is not taken into account when selecting the
34unconstrained agent. As a result, when preference shocks are large, the algorithm may select the
wrong region to price the assets. To investigate the eﬀects of this omission on the parameter esti-
mates, we conduct a sensitivity analysis described in appendix A.4. It amounts to giving a weight
less than one, in a weighted average of intertemporal marginal rates of substitution, to the region
that is predicted to be the unconstrained region. From table 9 (in appendix A.4) we conclude
that our estimation procedure is robust to the omission of region-speciﬁc preference shocks in the
selection of the region that prices the assets.
Second, region-speciﬁc income and rental price growth variables are deviations from a cross-
region average. Up until now, this average weighted regions equally. As a robustness check, we
estimate the model with variables that are deviations from a population-weighted average. The
population weight for region i at time t is deﬁned as its number of households divided by the
total number of households in all 23 regions at time t. The coeﬃcient estimates remain largely
unchanged, as reported in table 19. The R2 of the model is between 60 and 66 percent depending
on the collateral measure.
Third, the model assumes that consumption has the same price in each region: trade of non-
durables is costless. The real exchange rate for non-durables, deﬁned as a region’s non-durable
price level to the population-weighted, cross-region average of non-durable price levels, is one in
the model. In the metropolitan data, annual changes in real exchange rates for non-durables are
between -4.6 and +3.8 percent. To bring the data in line with the model, we express asset returns
in regional consumption units. Regional real exchange rates do not vary enough to aﬀect the asset
pricing results in any substantial way. Table 20 shows that the ﬁt of the model and the coeﬃcient
estimates are largely unchanged.
As a ﬁnal robustness check, we use regional consumption data directly instead of proxying the
regional Pareto-Negishi weight process (equation 20). The stochastic discount factor now contains
the unconstrained agents’ consumption growth and relative rental price growth as the only asset
pricing factors. We ﬁnd similar estimates for ° and Á: 0:26 and 0:03. In recent work, Brav,
Constantinides and Geczy (2002) ﬁnd that higher order moments of the distribution of consumption
growth across US households aﬀect asset prices, in particular the variance and skewness. Here, the
higher order cross-sectional moment relevant for asset pricing is the minimal consumption growth
across households (regions).
7.2.4 Comparison Across Models
The cross-sectional explanatory power of the collateral-CAPM proposed in this paper compares
favorably to other asset pricing models. Table 6 compares return-based asset pricing models in
rows 1-3 with consumption-based models in rows 4-6.
The capital asset pricing model relates the returns on stocks to their correlation with the
return on the wealth portfolio. In the standard CAPM of Lintner (1965), the return on the wealth
portfolio is proxied by the market return Rvw (row 1). It explains 36 percent of annual returns.
Because stock market wealth is a very incomplete total wealth measure, Jagannathan and Wang
35(1996) include the return on human wealth in the return on the wealth portfolio. The R2 in row
2 increases slightly to 39 percent. In contrast to Jagannathan and Wang (1996), we assume that
human wealth cannot be traded. In our model, human wealth aﬀects ﬁnancial returns only through
the housing collateral ratio. In addition, our model points towards another often ignored source of
wealth: housing. In the representative agent economy of Santos and Veronesi (2001) the ratio of
labor income to consumption lc predicts stock returns. Times in which investors ﬁnance a large
fraction of consumption out of labor income rather than out of stock dividend income (lc is high),
are less risky. The risk premium is lower: ˜ ¸3 < 0 in row 3. Their conditional CAPM explains 53
percent of the annual returns.11
The Fama and French (1993) three-factor model adds a size and a book-to-market factor to the
standard CAPM. The size factor is the return on a hedge portfolio that goes long in small ﬁrms
and short in big ﬁrms (smb). The value factor is the return on a hedge portfolio that goes long in
high book-to-market ﬁrms and short in low book-to-market ﬁrms (hml). This model accounts for
79 percent of the cross-sectional variation in annual returns (row 7). There is a 3.4 percent point
size premium and a 6.3 percent point value premium in our sample. Given its good ﬁt, this model
serves as the empirical benchmark.
In contrast to the previous models, the consumption-based asset pricing models measure the
riskiness of an asset by its covariance with marginal utility growth. One of the objectives of
this literature has been to identify macroeconomic sources of risk that can explain the empirical
success of the Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market factors. The fourth row reports
the standard CCAPM of Breeden (1979). The only factor is consumption growth. It explains
15 percent of the cross-sectional variation in returns. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) explore a
conditional version of the CCAPM with the consumption-wealth ratio as scaling variable. The ratio
is measured as the deviation from the common trend in consumption, labor income and ﬁnancial
wealth (cay). Periods with high cay indicate high expected future returns, thereby rationalizing
a high propensity to consume out of wealth. The market price of consumption risk increases in
times with low cay (recessions). The Lettau-Ludvigson model explains 33 percent of the annual
cross-sectional variation.12 In contrast to the consumption-wealth ratio (cay), our conditioning
variable does not contain direct information on future returns.
Model 6 is our collateral-CAPM with aggregate pricing factors and scaling variable myfa.13
For parsimony we omit the interaction term with rental price growth. The model goes a long way
in accounting for the cross-sectional diﬀerences in returns on the 25 Fama-French portfolios. The
11The authors also investigate a scaled version of the CCAPM, as we do, but their results for the scaled CCAPM
are not as strong as for the scaled CAPM. We construct their scaling variable as the ratio of annual labor income to
total consumption expenditures, for the period 1926-2001. We rescale the scaling variable lc: e lct = 1 +
lct¡E(lc)
std(lc) :
12We construct the cay variable for the period 1926-2001 using log real per household total consumption expendi-
tures (c), log real per household labor income plus transfers (ylt) and log real per household ﬁnancial wealth (fw).
We ﬁnd evidence for one cointegration relationship between the three variables. The estimated relationship we ﬁnd
with annual data is cay = c ¡ 0:294fw ¡ 0:702ylt + 0:452. We follow Lettau and Ludvigson and rescale the scaling
variable cay: g cayt = 1 +
cayt¡E(cay)
std(cay) :
13We rescale the my variable: f myt = 1 +
myt
std(my):
36R2 of 78 percent comes close to the ﬁt of the Fama-French model.
Model ˜ ¸0 ˜ ¸1 ˜ ¸2 ˜ ¸3 ˜ ¸4 R2
1 ¡1:42 10:38 36:3
Static CAPM (3:95) (4:59) 33:7
Lintner [4:41] [5:66]
2 ¡0:12 9:17 3:75 39:1
Human Capital-CAPM (3:80) (4:47) (1:81) 33:8
Jagannathan-Wang [4:41] [5:71] [2:30]
3 ¡:68 9:52 :09 ¡8:60 52:9
lc-conditional CAPM (4:17) (4:75) (0:24) (7:87) 46:5
Santos-Veronesi [5:49] [6:68] [0:34] [11:00]
4 8:17 3:86 15:0
Static CCAPM (2:39) (2:57) 11:5
Breeden-Lucas [2:68] [3:01]
5 11:64 1:36 ¡:62 ¡9:32 33:3
cay-conditional CCAPM (3:10) (2:47) (:28) (6:97) 24:3
Lettau-Ludvigson [4:23] [3:48] [:40] [9:69]
6 6:49 :64 :32 ¡:04 ¡6:39 78:1
Collateral-CAPM (2:26) (2:46) (:44) (:20) (4:75) 74:0
this paper [3:31] [3:71] [:66] [0:32] [7:18]
7 11:03 ¡2:97 3:37 6:33 79:3
Three-factor model (4:77) (5:32) (1:84) (1:80) 76.4
Fama-French [5:46] [6:55] [2:74] [2:65]
Table 6: Model Comparison: 7 models, 1927-2001. Row 1: factor is R
vw;e





Row 3 factors: R
vw;e
t+1 , lct and lctR
vw;e









t+1 , and R
hml;e
t+1 . The second column
gives the zero-¯ return ˜ ¸0. OLS standard errors are in parenthesis, Shanken corrected standard errors are in brackets.
7.3 Regional Risk-Sharing
The third and last empirical exercise uses regional data to test the collateral eﬀect directly. Using
metropolitan income, consumption and housing data we examine risk-sharing patterns directly. We
ﬁnd evidence that US metropolitan regions share a larger proportion of idiosyncratic risk when the
housing collateral ratio is high. We interpret the ﬁndings as direct support for the mechanism that
drives the asset pricing predictions.
In the complete markets model with perfect commitment, consumption growth is equal across
agents and uncorrelated with any source of idiosyncratic risk. In our metropolitan data, income
growth is more strongly correlated across regions than consumption growth. The time average of
the cross-sectional correlation of consumption growth is 0.27, lower than the cross-correlation of
labor income growth of 0.48. From the perspective of the complete markets model this is a puzzle,
also known as the “quantity anomaly” ˙ Time-variation in the degree of risk-sharing due to changes
in the value of housing collateral sheds new light on the consumption correlation puzzle.
37Quantifying the Extent of Risk-Sharing The consumption Euler equation in (19) is the







relates region-speciﬁc consumption growth to region-speciﬁc income growth, rental price growth

















+(1 ¡ ¯1 + ¯2myt)ºi
t: (29)
Recall that º contains the preference shifters and that ¯1 and ¯2 are a function of the lower
and upper bounds on the housing collateral ratio:
ºi
t = (1 ¡ °)∆ˆ b
i;c
t ¡ Á ˆ Ai
t¡1∆ˆ b
i;c






mymax ¡ mymin; ¯2 =
1
mymax ¡ mymin:
With separable preferences and fully-enforceable contracts, regional non-durable consumption
growth only varies with average non-durable consumption growth ∆loga ct. This captures aggregate
risk. Limited enforceability leads to partial insurance. Consumption is allocated with regard to
income shocks: The equilibrium consumption share increases for a household with above average
income growth (¯1 > 0). A higher housing collateral ratio my allows for more risk sharing: the
correlation between consumption share and income share growth decreases (¯2 > 0).
With non-separable preferences and fully-enforceable contracts, the region-speciﬁc component
of rental price growth aﬀects consumption growth. Under complementarity (Á > 0), consumption






forceability and non-separability interact. The equilibrium consumption share increases for regions
with below-average rental price growth. A higher my allows for more risk sharing: the correlation
between consumption share and region-speciﬁc rental price growth decreases (¯2 > 0).
The degree of risk sharing can be summarized by a simple statistic:
Ωt = 1 ¡ (¯1 ¡ ¯2myt):
When myt = mymax > 0; Ωt = 1: 100 percent of idiosyncratic risk is shared. When myt = mymin <
0; Ωt = 0: 0 percent of idiosyncratic risk is shared. Ωt measures the distance between the Pareto
frontier of the limited commitment economy and the frontier for the autarkic economy. 1 ¡ Ωt
measures the distance between the Pareto frontier of the limited commitment economy and the
frontier of the perfect enforcement economy.
Testing Full Consumption Insurance In the benchmark model with perfect commitment there
is full consumption insurance. All agents equate their intertemporal marginal rates of substitution.
Variables capturing idiosyncratic risk should not change the consumption distribution (Cochrane
(1991b) and Mace (1991)). Only aggregate risk factors change the intertemporal marginal rate of
38substitution over time. The null hypothesis of full insurance is H0 : ¯1 = ¯2 = 0 in equation (29).
Identiﬁcation and Econometric Issues Before proceeding to the estimation of equation (29),
we deﬁne the error process "
i;c
t . We allow for multiplicative measurement error ³t in log idiosyncratic
consumption levels. This implies a MA(1) structure for measurement error in consumption growth.
The error process contains preference shocks and measurement error:
"
i;c
t = (1 ¡ ¯1 + ¯2myt)ºi
t + ³t ¡ ³t¡1:





= 0; 8k ¸ 0. Since only aggregate variables aﬀect
the aggregate housing collateral ratio my and only region-speciﬁc preference shifts enter in ºi, the
assumption follows from the theory.
Correlation between residuals and regressors renders least squares estimators of the parameters
in equation (29) inconsistent. Therefore, it is important to understand when such correlation arises.
When ∆log ˆ yi
t and ∆logˆ ½i
t are cross-sectionally independent of "
i;c
t , the regressors and residuals
are orthogonal. This assumption is clearly violated for household-level data. For example, a fam-
ily expansion changes preferences for housing ∆ˆ b
i;h






However, at the metropolitan level such demographical shocks average out when aggregating over
households. Indeed, the metropolitan data show that household-level characteristics such as aver-
age household size, age of head, and female labor supply are very similar across the 23 metropolitan
areas. In contrast, an adverse shock to an industry predominantly located in one region, a large
population inﬂux in a region, or a change in the demographical composition may aﬀect all house-
holds in one region alike. Such shocks certainly aﬀect regional rental price growth and per household
income growth, but it is less obvious that they aﬀect preference changes or measurement error in a
systematic way. Only when they do, income and rental price changes need to be instrumented to
obtain consistent estimates. In that case, an instrumental variables estimator that uses 2-period
and 3-period leads of dependent and independent variables as instruments is consistent (Arellano
and Bond (1991)).





















The degree of risk sharing Ωt moves over time. The last column reports the lowest, median and














ˆ ¯1 ¡ ˆ ¯2myhi
´i
:
Two-thirds of disposable income shocks are shared on average (rows 1-3, last column). The
39estimate is ﬁfty percent when labor income plus transfers growth is used (rows 7-9). Similar
magnitudes are found for the US states (e.g. Hess and Shin (1998)), but they are much lower than
the 80-95 percent found for household data (e.g. Krueger (2000)). The null hypothesis of complete
consumption insurance is strongly rejected. The p-value for a Wald test of ¯1 = ¯2 = 0 is 0.00 for
all rows in table 7.
We ﬁnd that the correlation of regional consumption and income is lower when housing collateral
is abundant: ¯2 is always positive in rows 1-9. This is the sign predicted by the theory. Furthermore,
the last column shows that the time-variation in the degree of risk sharing is substantial. For low
values of the collateral ratio, risk sharing is as low as 43 percent. In times of abundant housing
collateral, up to 93 percent of income shocks can be shared (row 3). In 1945, real estate wealth
was 33 percent below its trend with human wealth (myfa = ¡:33). The estimates for ¯1 and ¯2
from row 3 imply that the economy was in autarky.
The estimates for ¯1 through ¯4 are consistent with Á < 0, i.e. substitutability between housing
and non-durable consumption in the utility function. A Wald test for H0 : Á =
¯1¡1
¯3 = 0 has a
p-value of 0.00 in rows 1 through 3. The estimates for ¯2 and ¯4 are also consistent with Á < 0,
but the evidence for non-separability is not as strong. The p-value for H0 : Á =
¯4
¯2 = 0 is .24, .06
and .52 in rows 1-3 respectively.
¯1 ¾¯1 ¯2 ¾¯2 ¯3 ¾¯3 ¯4 ¾¯4 R
2 Ω
1 - mymo .33 .03 .26 .19 .85 .13 -1.96 1.20 9.6 [57;67;72]
2 - myrw .36 .03 1.53 .53 .88 .12 -3.83 1.71 9.9 [50;64;84]
3 - myfa .36 .03 2.05 .62 .90 .12 -1.37 1.93 10.0 [43;62;93]
4 - mymo .34 .02 .36 .26 .96 .06 -1.11 .71 9.1 [64;67;72]
5 - myrw .34 .02 1.27 .32 .93 .05 -2.36 .79 9.4 [54;63;82]
6 - myfa .36 .02 1.17 .32 .93 .06 -.61 1.00 9.4 [52;63;80]
7 - mymo .49 .02 .52 .30 .91 .08 -1.23 .81 14.1 [48;52;60]
8 - myrw .47 .02 .29 .30 .91 .06 -2.84 .87 14.0 [50;52;57]
9 - myfa .49 .02 .56 .31 .95 .06 -1.64 1.10 14.0 [45;50;59]
10 - myrw 0.52 0.08 5.53 1.43 0.68 0.21 -9.61 2.42 [0;48;100]
11 - myfa 0.58 0.08 2.67 1.48 0.28 0.22 -6.17 3.32 [15;39;79]
Table 7: Testing the Collateral Eﬀect with Aggregate Collateral Measures.Rows 1-3 are for the period
1952-2001 (1069 observations). They use mymo;myrw and myfa respectively and idiosyncratic income is disposable personal
income. Rows 4-6 are identical to rows 1-3 but are for the period 1970-2000 (702 observations). Regressions 7-9 use labor
income plus transfers, available only for 1970-2000. The coeﬃcients on the ﬁxed eﬀect, ¯i
0, are not reported. The interval Ω
is calculated using the estimated intercept and slope coeﬃcient on income and the minimum, median and maximum realized
values for my during the estimation period. Estimation is by feasible GLS allowing for both cross-section heteroskedasticity and







t+3), myrwt+2, myrwt+3 resp. myfat+2, myfat+3. The period is 1952-1998 (997
observations).
Row 10 (11) of table 7 report instrumental variable (3SLS) estimates where income and rental
price changes are instrumented by 2 and 3-period leads of independent and dependent variables.
The collateral ratio is myrw (myfa). On average forty to ﬁfty percent of income shocks are shared.
The instrumental variables estimates imply a substantial degree of time-variation in risk-sharing.
For the residential wealth measure myrw, Ω covers the entire unit interval.
40Regional Housing Collateral So far we have used aggregate collateral measures only. This
is consistent with our theoretical setup in which households are allowed to own a fraction of the
housing stock in diﬀerent regions. When households are restricted to be the full owner of the hous-
ing stock in their region, regional collateral measures aﬀect risk-sharing. In that case, the planner
is prevented to reallocate housing endowments across regions. as a result, houses are priced oﬀ
the region-speciﬁc intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, rather than oﬀ the IMRS of the
unconstrained agents. This modiﬁes the collateral constraints. We pursue this additional restric-
tion on allocations in Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh (2002). Here we want to test this prediction
empirically.
We ﬁnd that the regional collateral variables lend additional support to the collateral eﬀect. In
particular, regions with a higher home ownership rate and regions with a higher value of housing
wealth are better able to smooth regional income shocks. Table 8 summarizes the ﬁndings and
appendix A.5 describes the regional collateral data in detail.
Regions with a higher home-ownership rate can sustain a higher degree of risk sharing (row 1).
¯2 is positive and measured precisely. The minimal and maximal home ownership rate observed in
the sample imply variation in risk-sharing between 52 and 66 percent.
Likewise, a higher regional housing collateral value increases the degree of risk-sharing. The log
deviation of the collateral value in region i from the cross-sectional median, c hvit, is the measure
of regional collateral abundance used in row 2. The estimate ¯2 is statistically unambiguously
positive. Time variation in the regional collateral variable implies variation in risk-sharing between
44 and 74 percent.
Rows 3 to 5 show that when both the interaction term with my and the interaction term with
c hvit are included, the regional collateral eﬀect remains, whereas the aggregate collateral interaction
term have mostly insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates.
¯1 ¾¯1 ¯2 ¾¯2 ¯3 ¾¯3 ¯4 ¾¯4 R
2 Ω
1 - HO
i .69 .07 .48 .12 .74 .29 -.57 .47 13.8 [52;61;66]
2 - c hvi .45 .02 .09 .02 1.05 .05 .18 .07 13.6 [44;54;74]
3 - c hvi .45 0.02 .09 .02 .94 .06 .17 .07 13.6
mymo .01 .25 -1.49 .62
4 - c hvi .44 .02 .08 .02 1.03 .05 .19 .07 13.5
myrw -.72 .33 -.79 .75
5 - c hvi .43 .02 .08 .02 1.09 .05 .19 .07 13.7
myfa .62 0.29 .78 .74





























t : In regression 1 Xi is the region-speciﬁc home-ownership
rate (594 observations). In regression 2, Xi is c hvit, the log ratio of hvi
t = HV i
t =p
i;a
t to the cross-sectional median hvmed
t (574
observations). The interval Ω denotes the minimum, median and maximum degree of inter-regional risk sharing. It is calculated
using the estimated intercept and slope coeﬃcient on income and the minimum, median and maximum actual values for the
home ownership rate and c hvit in the years 1975-2000 and across regions. In regression 3-5, Xi includes both the interaction term
of regression 2 and the interaction term between income share growth and the aggregate collateral measures mymo (regression
3), myrw (regression 4) and myfa (regression 5). The coeﬃcient on the interaction term with my is reported in the columns
¯2 and ¯4 in the second row. In all regressions y is labor income plus transfers. The coeﬃcients on the ﬁxed eﬀect, ¯i
0; are not
reported. Estimation is by feasible GLS allowing for both cross-section heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.
All regressions are for the period 1975-2000, the longest period with metropolitan house price data.
418 Conclusion
This paper develops a general equilibrium asset pricing model with housing collateral. Agents have
to back up their state-contingent promises with the value of their house. Time variation in the price
of housing induces time variation in the economy’s ability to share labor income risk. In recessions,
the collateral value is low and there is an endogenous increase in idiosyncratic risk. Agents demand
a higher risk premium to hold equity.
Empirical evidence supports the collateral eﬀect. Conditional on the housing collateral ratio,
the consumption-CAPM explains the cross-sectional variation in size and book-to-market portfolio
returns as well as the Fama and French (1993) model. This is true for a ﬁrst version of the
model with frictionless rental markets, which we test with aggregate data as well as for a second
version with housing market frictions, which we test with regional data. Using the same regional
data set, we ﬁnd direct evidence for the mechanism underlying the pricing results: time variation
in the extent of risk-sharing. Our theory only predicts strong consumption growth correlations
when my is high. The data seem to support this qualiﬁcation; conditioning on my weakens the
consumption growth puzzle for US regions. Our hope is that ﬂuctuations in housing collateral can
help understand risk-sharing patterns at the household and the international level.
A fully calibrated version of the model is capable of generating values for the mean and volatility
of the excess return, dividend-price ratio and risk-free rate in line with historical stock market
return and the T-bill rate moments (Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh (2002)). Persistence in the
pricing kernel, coming from the persistence of the housing collateral ratio, helps reconcile a low
term premium with a high equity premium (Alvarez and Jermann (2001)).
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45A Appendix
A.1 Competitive Equilibrium with Time-Zero Markets
We show under which conditions the sequence of budget constraints and collateral constraints in the sequential
market setup can be rewritten as one time-zero budget constraint and the collection of collateral constraints shown
in equation (9). The proof strategy follows Sargent (1984) (Ch. 8). We then formally state the household problem
and deﬁne an equilibrium in which all trading takes place at time zero. Finally, we outline a procedure to compute
time-zero equilibria. We show that the Pareto-Negisihi weights in the planner problem (in the main text) are the
cumulative multipliers on the collateral constraints in the time-zero equilibrium.
Budget Constraint First, we show how the Arrow-Debreu budget constraint obtains from aggregating suc-







































Multiply the second equation by qt+1(s










































































































































































































Let Πst be the value of a dividend stream fdg starting in history s









where for a given path s
t+j following history s












































t+j) = 0; (31)

















; 8j ¸ 0;8s
t+j (32)
If the latter condition were not satisﬁed, a household could achieve unbounded consumption by investing suf-
ﬁciently high amounts in housing shares ! and ﬁnancing this by borrowing. This is a feasible strategy because
































Collateral Constraints Second, we show the equivalence between the collateral constraints of the sequential














































































t) for all s
t;t ¸ 0: (34)
An allocation is immune to the threat of default if the allocation satisﬁes the time-zero collateral constraint (33) for
each agent. Under conditions (31) and (32) an allocation that is feasible and immune to the threat of default in
sequential markets is feasible and immune to the threat of default in time-zero markets.
The equivalence implies that the portfolio shares !
i in the sequential economy are indeterminate.









at market state prices f¹½g. For expositional

































such that (i) for given prices, the households solve their opti-
mization problem and (ii) the markets for the consumption good and the housing services clear, for all s
t.
Computation It is more convenient to work with the dual problem for the household. Given Arrow-Debreu








































and the collateral constraints (33).
The initial promised value w
i










The above problem is a convex programming problem. We ﬁrst set up the saddle point problem and then make







denote the sequence of













tjs0). By using Abel’s partial summation formula and



























































































i is the multiplier on the promise keeping constraint: The cumulative multiplier »
i is a non-decreasing stochas-
tic sequence (sub-martingale). If the constraint binds, it goes up, else it stays put.













Upon division of the ﬁrst order condition of agent i and j, the following restriction on the joint evolution of marginal


























































The time zero ratio of marginal utilities is pinned down by the ratio of multipliers on the promise-keeping
constraints. For t > 0; it tracks the stochastic weights »
i. From the ﬁrst order condition w.r.t. »






































Equivalence AD-Equilibrium and Eﬃcient Allocation The Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium
is equivalent to the constrained eﬃcient allocation from the planner problem for ¹ = ˜ ¹ and ½ = ˜ ½. The equivalence
arises from two facts. First, the ﬁrst-order conditions of the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium correspond to the ﬁrst-order
conditions of the planner problem . Second, the collateral constraints in equation (33) correspond to the participation
constraints in the planner economy. Note that the cumulative multiplier processes on the collateral constraints are
the Pareto-Negishi weights in the planner problem.
A.2 Euler Equation and Stochastic Discounter
This appendix derives the consumption Euler equation and the expression for the stochastic discount factor in the
economy with housing market frictions.
Euler equation The relative price of housing services ½
i





























t denotes the fraction of housing consumption to non-durable consumption and housing consumption of agent































































































































































+ (1 ¡ °)b
i;c






















































































We approximate the non-linear term in the marginal utility using the following two facts: (1) approximative
equivalence of log changes and percentage changes: if xt+1 > xt then
xt+1¡xt
xt+1 < ∆log(xt+1) <
xt+1¡xt
xt ; and (2)




























































































When taking averages across agents and subtracting the expression for the average from the expression for
individual consumption, changes in the state price deﬂator drop out as a time ﬁxed eﬀect. Idiosyncratic consumption















































t contains the preference shifters.
º
i;c
t = (1 ¡ °)∆ˆ b
i;c











1 ¡ ° ¡ ¾
1 ¡ ¾
￿














































Intertemporal Marginal Rate of Substitution The marginal utility of non-durables can be written





















50The log of the individual IMRS is
logm
i



















Using the approximation described above, we write the last term as a function of rental price changes.
logm
i








































Taking averages across agents
logm
a
t+1 ¼ log± ¡ °∆log
a (ct+1) ¡
￿






































































































































































The bootstrap procedure addresses the persistent-regressor bias and serial correlation in the OLS residuals. We
compute small-sample coeﬃcient estimates and small-sample p-values for the null hypothesis of no predictability.
A univariate speciﬁcation test shows that my is best described by an AR(2) process. If annual returns are









t+1 = b0 + e
1
t+1 (43)
myt+1 = c0 + c1myt + c2myt¡1 + e
2
t+1 (44)
where e is a bivariate i.i.d. mean zero process. Under the no-predictability null, K-period returns have a MA(K)
error structure because of overlapping observations. We estimate the long-horizon excess return regressions for
K = 1;2;:::;10 :
r
vw;K






t+K¡2 + ::: + ÁK¡1e
1
t+1: (45)
The bootstrap method consists of the following steps.
step 1 Jointly estimate the coeﬃcient on my and the K ¡ 1 moving average coeﬃcients in the r
vw;K and the
coeﬃcients in the AR(2) speciﬁcation for my.









step 3 For given my0 = my1 = 0 and parameter estimates from step 1, build up time series for r
e;K and myt+1
recursively from equations (45) and (44).
step 4 Estimate the coeﬃcients in the return equation. Let the coeﬃcient on my be b
¤
1.
step 5 Repeat steps 1 through 4 N = 5,000 times.









The second bootstrap exercise proceeds as the ﬁrst, except it imposes the null hypothesis of no predictability in
step 1. In step 4, let the coeﬃcient on my be b
¤¤
1 . The p-value is the frequency of observing estimates b
¤¤
1 smaller
than the least-squares estimate b
LS
1 .
A.4 Iterative Fama-MacBeth Procedure
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First, for each j;the vector ˜ ¯
j
is obtained from the time-series regression of returns on the factors. Given the
















t t = 1;2;:::;T (46)
Let Σ = E [²t²
0








. Second, for each t, a cross-sectional
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￿
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The pricing errors are the basis for a goodness of ﬁt statistic ˆ ®cov (ˆ ®)
¡1 ˆ ®. In a regression with K factors the
statistic has a Â
2 distribution with J ¡ K degrees of freedom. A second measure of ﬁt is the R
2 constructed from
the cross-sectional variance of the time-averages (denoted by a bar) of errors and returns for each of the portfolios:
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0s are generated regressors from a ﬁrst stage time-series analysis. Generally, this error in variables problem
gives rise to an underestimation of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix. The standard errors for ¸ and ® are
corrected following Shanken (1992). Let the matrix Σf be the covariance matrix of the factors F. The Shanken
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Cochrane (2001) (pp.241-242) describes a GMM procedure that carries out the time series and cross-sectional






Iterative Algorithm With limited commitment, the unconstrained agent is not known and her identity
changes over time. We propose the following ﬁxed-point algorithm. Make an initial guess for the parameter vector,
µ
0. Given µ














. The SDF in period t is mt = m
i¤
t












. Fourth, apply the two-step Fama-MacBeth procedure described







This is a new guess for the parameter vector, µ


















is found. Convergence on
µ is a consistency requirement that the estimated market prices of risk imply the same sequence of unconstrained
agents that were used to compute them.
Continuation Method In general, ﬁxed-point iterations are not globally convergent. The ﬁxed point problem





the relevant asset pricing factors changes. The max-operator, which identiﬁes the unconstrained agent, violates




















For Λ = 1, we select the agent with the maximum IMRS, for Λ = 0 the SDF is an equal weighting of all agents’
IMRS.
A continuation method uses local convergence properties to improve chances of global convergence (see Judd
(1998)). The idea is to construct a sequence of ﬁxed point problems that ultimately leads to the problem of interest.
A natural starting point is µ = T (µ;Λ); with Λ = 0. Equal weighting cancels the asset pricing factors under limited
commitment: ¯ f
lc = 0. Only aggregate factors ¯ f
cm matter and we are in the case of perfect enforcement. We use
the solution µ









a sequence of intermediary problems for 0 = Λ
0 < Λ
1 < :: < :Λ
k < Λ
k+1 < ::: < Λ
K, using the solution of the Λ
k
problem as an initial guess to the Λ
k+1.problem. Each intermediary problem satisﬁes the consistency requirement

















In every period, the unconstrained agent receives a weight of c 2 [0;1] on average.
Sensitivity Analysis for Regional Asset Pricing Results The stochastic discount factor is a
weighted average of the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution (IMRS) of all regions. When all regions receive
equal weight in the average we are in the perfect commitment world. With 23 regions, the region with the highest
predicted IMRS receives an average weight of
1
23. Equal weighting obtains for Λ = 0. When, in every period, the
region with the largest intertemporal marginal rate of substitution receives a weight of one we have implemented
equation (14). Giving the unconstrained region weight one corresponds to Λ = +1. In between these two polar
cases, we give a strictly positive weight to other regions according to the function (48).
In table 5 of section 7.2.3, we choose Λ = 20, which implies that the unconstrained region receives a weight of
.9 on average. In table 9 we solve the ﬁxed point problem for a range of Λ’s from 0.1 to 20. Each row of table 9
53Λ max-index (%) R
2 ˜ µ1 ˜ µ2 ˜ µ3 ˜ µ4 ˜ µ5 ˜ µ6
.25 14 56.2 .32 .64 .10 -.52 -3.21 -1.91
.50 19 58.2 .28 .67 .03 -.36 2.17 -1.32
.75 25 60.7 .23 .69 -.00 -.31 1.78 -1.09
1 34 68.8 .26 .98 -.22 -.17 2.85 -1.03
2 56 70.6 .14 .99 -.16 -.22 2.69 -.87
3 70 71.2 .08 .98 -.12 -.25 2.68 -.80
5 81 71.4 .08 .96 -.09 -.27 2.66 -.76
10 90 71.1 .05 .96 -.08 -.28 2.66 -.76
15 92 71.1 .09 .96 -.07 -.29 2.64 -.77
20 94 71.2 .09 .96 -.07 -.29 2.61 -.76
Table 9: Cross-Sectional Results with Regional Asset Pricing Factors: Sensitivity Analysis. The ﬁrst
column is the parameter Λ in the temperature function (see iterative Fama-MacBeth procedure in A.4). The second column
reports the average (over time) weight on the unconstrained region’s (predicted) intertemporal marginal rate of substitution
in the stochastic discount factor. The third column reports the R2 for the second stage of the Fama-MacBeth procedure,
evaluated at the ﬁxed point of the iteration. The other rows report the coeﬃcient estimates (the ﬁxed point ˜ µ itself). The
period is 1951-2001. The set of test assets is T1.
shows the estimates for the underlying parameters ˜ µ, for a diﬀerent parameter Λ. The two main ﬁndings are: (i)
the ﬁt of regional asset pricing factors improves by increasing Λ and (ii) both the parameter estimates and the R
2
remain virtually identical beyond Λ ¸ 2. That is, for a large range of weights on the region that is predicted to be
unconstrained, we obtain similar results from the estimation procedure (parameter estimates and R
2).
A.5 Data Appendix
Aggregate Housing Collateral For, 1889-2001, residential non-farm mortgage debt outstanding (series
N262) is based on Grebler-Blank-Winnick “Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate: Trends and Prospects”,
1956. Non-farm residential real estate (series N196) includes land and structures. Estimates are for housekeeping
dwellings and exclude hotels, dormitories, motels, clubs, etc. The series is based on David L. Wickens’ “Residential
Real Estate”, NBER, 1941. For 1945-2001, home mortgages are loans secured by one-to four-family properties,
including owner-occupied condominium units. The total includes second mortgages on these properties and home-
equity loans. We only consider the household sector. The market value of real estate wealth (table B.100, row 4)
includes land and structures, inclusive vacant land, vacant homes for sale, second homes and mobile homes.
Metropolitan Area The concept of a metropolitan areas is that of a core area containing a large population
nucleus, together with adjacent communities having a high degree of economic and social integration with that
core. They include metropolitan statistical areas (MSA’s), consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSA’s),
and primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSA’s). An area that qualiﬁes as an MSA and has a population of
one million or more may be recognized as a CMSA if separate component areas that demonstrate strong internal,
social, and economic ties can be identiﬁed within the entire area and local opinion supports the component areas.
Component areas, if recognized, are designated PMSA’s. If no PMSA’s are designated within the area, then the area
remains an MSA.
The S&MM survey uses the deﬁnitions of MSA throughout the survey and of CMSA when CMSA’s are created.
We use the 30 metropolitan areas described in table 10. Before the creation of the CMSA’s, we keep track of all
separate MSA’s that later form the CMSA in order to obtain a consistent time series. For example, the Dallas-Forth
Worth CMSA consists of the Dallas MSA and Forth Worth MSA until 1973 and of the combined area thereafter.
The total number of households in the 30 metropolitan areas is 47 percent of the US total in 2000 compared to
40 percent in 1951. The total number of households are from the Bureau of the Census. Most of the increase occurs
before 1965. Likewise, the 30 metropolitan areas we consider contain exactly 47 percent of the population in 1999
(see tables 10 and 12, ﬁrst column).
54Table 10: Metropolitan Areas. Total population numbers (in thousands) are displayed next to the metropolitan
areas. For the Consolidated Metropolitan areas (CMSA), the constituent MSA’s are listed and the fraction of their
population in the total of the CMSA is shown next to their name. All numbers are from the Regional Economic
Information System of the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the year 2000.
Anchorage (AK), MSA 261 Miami CMSA 3,897
Atlanta (GA), MSA 4,145 Miami, FL 58.1%
Baltimore (MD), MSA 2,557 Fort Lauderdale, FL 41.9%
Boston CMSA 6,068 Milwaukee CMSA 1,691
Boston, MA-NH 58.6% Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI 88.8%
Worcester, MA-CT 8.7% Racine, WI 11.2%
Lawrence, MA-NH 6.7% Minneapolis (MN-WI) MSA 2,797
Lowell, MA-NH 5.1% New York CMSA 21,134
Brockton, MA 4.3% New York, NY 45.5%
Portsmouth-Rochester, NH-ME 4.2% Bergen-Passaic, NJ 6.6%
Manchester, NH 3.4% Bridgeport, CT 0.5%
Nashua, NH 3.3% Dutchess County, NY 1.2%
New Bedford, MA 3.2% Danbury, CT 0.4%
Fitchburg-Leominster, MA 2.5% Jersey City, NJ 3.0%
Buﬀalo (NY), MSA 1,169 Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ 5.6%
Chicago CMSA 9,176 Monmouth-Ocean, NJ 5.4%
Chicago, IL 90.3% Nassau-Suﬀolk, NY 13.5%
Gary, IN 6.9% Newburgh, NY-PA 1.8%
Kenosha, WI 1.6% Newark, NJ 9.9%
Kankakee, IL 1.1% New Haven-Meriden, CT 6.2%
Cincinnati CMSA 1,983 Stamford-Norwalk, CT 0.6%
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 92.6% Trenton, NJ 1.7%
Hamilton-Middletown, OH 7.4% Waterbury, CT 0.5%
Cleveland CMSA 2,946 Philadelphia CMSA 6,194
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH 76.4% Philadelphia, PA-NJ 82.4%
Akron, OH 23.6% Wilmington, NC 9.5%
Dallas CMSA 5,254 Atlantic-Cape May, NJ 5.7%
Dallas, TX 67.4% Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ 2.3%
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 32.6% Phoenix - Mesa MSA 3,276
Denver CMSA 2,597 Pittsburgh (PA), MSA 2,356
Denver, CO 81.7% Portland CMSA 2,273
Boulder-Longmont, CO 11.3% Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA 84.7%
Greeley, CO 7.0% Salem, OR 15.3%
Detroit CMSA 5,463 Saint Louis (MO-IL), MSA 2,606
Detroit, MI 81.4% San Diego (CA), MSA 2,825
Ann Arbor, MI 10.6% San Francisco CMSA 7,056
Flint, MI 8.0% San Francisco, CA 24.6%
Honolulu (HI), MSA 876 San Jose, CA 23.9%
Houston CMSA 4,694 Oakland, CA 34.1%
Houston, TX 89.5% Vallejo-Fairﬁeld-Napa, CA 7.4%
Galveston-Texas City, TX 5.3% Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 3.6%
Brazoria, TX 5.2% Santa Rosa, CA 6.5%
Kansas City (MO-KS), MSA 1,782 Seattle CMSA 3,562
Los Angeles CMSA 16,440 Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 67.9%
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 58.1% Tacoma, WA 19.8%
Orange County, CA 17.4% Bremerton, WA 6.5%
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 20.0% Olympia, WA 5.8%
Ventura, CA 4.6% Tampa (FL), MSA 2,404
Washington,DC-MD-VA-WV, PMSA 4,948
Regional Housing Collateral Following Case, Quigley and Shiller (2001), we construct the market value














0 is the median house price for detached single family housing from the US Bureau of the Census for 2000. For the
CMSA’s, it is constructed as a population weighted average of the median home value for the constituent MSA’s.
Population data are from the REIS.
HP
i
t is the housing price index from the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, based on the weighted
repeat sales method of Case and Shiller (1987). It measures house price increases in detached single family homes
between successive sales or mortgage reﬁnancing of the identical housing unit. The index is available from 1975
onwards for all MSA’s. We construct an index for the CMSA’s as a population weighted average of the MSA’s.
There is a literature on quality-controlled house price indices. They broadly fall into two categories. Hedonic
methods capture the contribution of narrowly deﬁned dwelling unit and location characteristics to the price of a house
in a certain region (number of bedrooms, garage, neighborhood safety, school district, etc.). Out of sample, houses are
priced as a bundle of such characteristics. Repeat sales indices are based on houses that have been sold or appraised
twice. Because they pertain to the same property, they control for a number of hedonic characteristics (bedrooms,
neighborhood safety, etc.). See Pollakowski (1995) for a literature review and a description of data availability. The
OFHEO database contains 17 million transactions over the last 27 years.
Home ownership rates HO
i
t are from the US. Bureau of the Census. We combine home ownership rates for 1980,
1990 and 2000 from the Decennial Census with annual home ownership data for the largest 75 cities for 1986-2001,
also from the Bureau of the Census. We project a home ownership rate for 1986 using the 1980 and 1990 number and
the annual changes in the national home ownership rate. We use the changes in the major cities to infer MSA-level
changes between 1986 and 1990. Between 1981 and 1986 and 1975 and 1979 we apply national changes to the MSA’s.
This procedure captures most of the regional and time series behavior of home-ownership rates. Figure 8 shows a
gradual increase in the US home-ownership starting in 1965, only interrupted by a decline in the period 1980-95.
Table 11 illustrates the large regional diﬀerences in the median home value and home ownership rate in 1980 and
2000.







t shows that the ﬁrst principal component explains 74% of the total variation in regional
housing values. The largest three principal components explain 95% of the variation. The ﬁrst principal component
of the region-speciﬁc c hvit is 55 percent and the ﬁrst 3 principal components account for 92 percent of the variation
in the idiosyncratic collateral value.
Deﬂation All variables are expressed in real terms. We deﬂate by the region-speciﬁc price index. Let p
ia
t be
the price level and ¼
ia

















be the inﬂation rate at time t for non-durable consumption (housing
consumption) of agent i. The nominal value of the housing stock is deﬂated by p
ia







t . Denote real per household quantities by lower case letters. The change in the idiosyncratic component of






















































Consumption and Income in Detail We collect data from the Survey of Buying Power (and Media
Markets), a special September issue of the magazine Sales and Marketing Management. The data are proprietary
and we thank S&MM for permission to use them. We use ﬁve series and reproduce the S&MM deﬁnitions below.
Total retail sales measures sales from ﬁve major store groups considered to be the primary channels of distribution
for consumer goods in local markets. Store group sales represent the cumulative sales of all products and or services
handled by a particular store type, not just the product lines associated with the name of the store group. The
ﬁve store groups are: food stores, automotive dealers, eating and drinking places, furniture, home furnishings and
appliance stores, and general merchandize stores. Total retail sales reﬂect net sales. Receipts from repairs and other
services by retailers are also included, but retail sales by wholesalers and service establishments are not.
56Table 11: Median Home Value and Home-Ownership Rate. The table shows median home values for 1980
and 2000 (in thousands of nominal dollars) and the home ownership rate for 1980 and 2000. All data are from the
US Bureau of the Census, Decennial Survey 1980 and 2000
MSA V80 V00 HO80 HO00
Washington, DC (PMSA) 79.9 178.9 54.3 64.0
Baltimore, MD (PMSA) 51.4 134.9 60.0 66.9
Atlanta, GA (MSA) 47.7 135.3 61.4 66.4
Miami, FL (CMSA) 57.0 126.1 61.5 63.2
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (CMSA) 45.6 100.0 64.7 60.4
Houston, TX (CMSA) 52.8 89.7 59.1 60.7
Tampa, FL (MSA) 39.9 93.8 71.7 70.8
San Francisco, CA (CMSA) 98.4 353.5 55.8 57.8
Los Angeles, CA (CMSA) 87.6 203.3 53.8 54.8
San Diego, CA (MSA) 90.0 227.2 55.1 55.4
Portland, OR (CMSA) 60.8 165.4 63.2 63.0
Seattle, WA (CMSA) 66.0 195.4 63.8 62.9
Honolulu, HI (MSA) 129.5 309.0 49.9 54.6
Anchorage, AK (MSA) 89.2 160.7 56.6 60.1
Denver, CO (CMSA) 69.1 179.5 63.0 66.4
Phoenix, AZ (MSA) 59.2 127.9 68.7 68.0
New York, NY (CMSA) 62.5 203.1 44.2 53.0
Philadelphia, PA (CMSA) 42.2 122.3 67.7 69.9
Boston, MA (CMSA) 52.0 203.0 54.8 60.6
Pittsburgh, PA (MSA) 42.7 68.1 69.0 71.3
Buﬀalo, NY (MSA) 39.7 89.1 63.7 66.2
Chicago, IL (CMSA) 62.8 159.0 58.5 65.2
Detroit, MI (CMSA) 43.5 132.6 70.2 72.2
Milwaukee, WI (CMSA) 59.2 131.9 61.1 62.1
Minneapolis-St, Paul, MN (MSA) 62.3 141.2 67.2 72.4
Cleveland, OH (CMSA) 52.1 117.9 66.6 68.8
Cincinnati, OH (CMSA) 47.9 116.5 63.8 67.1
St. Louis, MO (MSA) 41.8 99.4 68.2 71.4
Kansas City, MO-KS (MSA) 43.5 104.7 66.4 67.9
Tampa, FL (MSA) 59,925 85,248 73.0 71.0
Automotive dealer sales are sales by retail establishments primarily engaged in selling new and used vehicles for
personal use and in parts and accessories for these vehicles. This includes boat and aircraft dealers and excludes
gasoline service stations.
Furniture, home furnishings and appliance store sales measures sales by retail stores selling goods used for
the home, other than antiques. It includes dealers in electronics (radios, TV’s, computers and software), musical
instruments and sheet music, and recordings.
Households measures the number of households, deﬁned by the Census which includes all persons occupying a
housing unit. A single person living alone in a housing unit is also considered to be a household. The members of a
household need not be related.
Eﬀective Buying Income is an income measure of income developed by S&MM. It is equivalent to disposable
personal income, as produced by the BEA in the NIPA tables. It is deﬁned as the sum of labor market income, ﬁnancial
income and net transfers minus taxes. Labor income is wages and salaries, other labor income (such as employer
contributions to private pension funds), and proprietor’s income (net farm and non-farm self-employment income).
Financial income is interests (from all sources), dividends (paid by corporations), rental income (including imputed
rental income of owner-occupants of non-farm dwellings) and royalty income. Net transfers is Social Security and
railroad retirement, other retirement and disability income, public assistance income, unemployment compensation,
Veterans Administration payments, alimony payments, alimony and child support, military family allotments, net
57winnings from gambling, and other periodic income minus social security contributions. Taxes is personal tax (federal,
state and local), non-tax payments (ﬁnes, fees, penalties, ...) and taxes on owner-occupied nonbusiness real estate.
Not included is money received from the sale of property, the value of income in kind (food stamps, public housing
subsidy, medical care, employer contributions for persons), withdrawal of bank deposits, money borrowed, tax refunds,
exchange of money between family members living in the same household, gifts and inheritances, insurance payments
and other types of lump-sum receipts. Income is benchmarked to the decennial Census data.
We create a durable retail sales series by adding automotive dealer sales and furniture, home furnishings and
appliance store sales. Non-durable retail sales is total retail sales minus durable retail sales.
Comparison with Aggregate Data We construct aggregate non-durable retail sales per households and
compare it to aggregate non-durable consumption per household. The aggregate consumption data are from the
National Income and Product Accounts. The two nominal time series are very similar. Non-durable metropolitan
retail sales per household are on average 17 percent higher than national non-durable consumption per household.
Their correlation between their growth rates is 0.77. The one exception is 1999 when retail sales grow at a rate of
19.6 percent compared to 5.6 percent for non-durable consumption. We believe this is an anomaly in the data and
deﬂate the 1999 retail sales so that the metropolitan average growth rate equals the national one. This correction is
identical across areas.
We compare the sum of motor vehicles and parts and furniture and household equipment for the US. to the
metropolitan data on automotive dealer sales and furniture, home furnishings and appliance store sales. Nationwide,
these two categories of consumption make up 84 percent of all durable purchases. Sales are higher by an average
of 30 percent. The pattern of the two series mimic each other closely. The correlation between national durable
consumption growth and the average metropolitan durable retail sale growth is 0.80. For 1999 the sales data show
a much bigger increase than the durable consumption data (27 percent versus 8.6 percent). As for non-durables, we
correct the 1999 metropolitan retail sales for this discrepancy. We refer to the two series as metropolitan non-durable
and durable consumptionper household.
Eﬀective buying income (EBI) per household corresponds to the BEA’s disposable income (personal income
minus personal tax and non-tax payments). The S&MM income data are tracking disposable income closely. There
are a two discrete jumps in the EBI time-series (1988 and 1995), but the concept remains disposable, personal income.
The S&MM is not precise as to which income categories were excluded between 1987 and 1988 and between 1994 and
1995. From comparing the deﬁnition of EBI before and after the changes, it seems to us that the most important
changes are the exclusion of other labor income (such as employer contributions to pension plans, ...) and income
in kind (such as food stamps, housing subsidies, medial care,...). To obtain a consistent time-series, we correct the
S&MM income data by the ratio of average EBI to disposable income from the NIPA. This correction is identical
across areas. We refer to this series as metropolitan disposable income per household. Table 12 summarizes.
Table 12: Aggregate Metropolitan and US data
Year HH metr. HH to nond sales nond. sales to dur. sales dur. sales EBI EBI to
(000) US HH (%) per HH ($) nondur. cons. per HH ($) dur. cons per HH ($) disp. inc.
1951 17,623 39.4 3,008 1.23 799 1.36 5,959 1.15
1960 23,080 43.7 3,519 1.22 899 1.26 7,711 1.11
1970 28,332 44.7 4,688 1.09 1,180 1.05 11,936 1.03
1980 36,144 44.7 9,683 1.12 2,660 1.24 24,975 1.00
1990 41,784 44.8 15,418 1.15 5,531 1.37 43,698 0.95
2000 49,379 47.2 24,741 1.30 11,888 1.90 56,566 0.83
Comparison with CEX Data We compare the SM&M data to the non-durable and durable consumption
data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). Based on household data, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
58provides metropolitan averages for 13 overlapping two-year periods (1986-87 until 1994-95 and 1996-97 until 1999-
2000). The two data sources have 25 regions with full data in common. Buﬀalo is in the CEX sample until 1994-95
and is replaced by Tampa, Denver and Phoenix from 1996-97 onwards.
Consumption expenditures on non-durables are deﬁned as in Attanasio and Weber (1995): It includes food at
home, food away from home, alcohol, tobacco, utilities, fuels and public services (natural gas, heating fuel electricity,
water, telephone and other personal services), transportation (gasoline and motor oil, public transportation), apparel
and services (clothes, shoes, other apparel products and services), entertainment, personal care products and services,
reading, and miscellaneous items. Durable consumption includes vehicle purchases and household furnishings and




t is comprised of owned
dwellings, rented dwellings and other lodging. The CEX imputes the cost for owner-occupied dwellings by adding
up mortgage interest rates, property taxes and maintenance, improvements, repairs, property insurance and other
expenditures. The average expenditure share on housing was 31.5 percent in 2000.
Non-durable and housing services consumption add up to 55-60 percent of total annual consumption expenditures.
Excluded consumption items are consumer durables (furniture, household supplies), vehicle purchases, insurance
(vehicle, life, social security), health care and education.
For each area, we construct bi-annual averages from the S&MM consumption data. The correlation between all
data cells is 0.77 for non-durables and 0.66 for durables. The average correlation across regions is 0.88 for non-durables
and 0.73 for durables. We conclude that the metropolitan sales data give an accurate measure of consumption on
non-durables and durables at the metropolitan level.
We also compare the bi-annual averages of before-tax income from the CEX with the metropolitan disposable
income. The correlation is high for each region. The average correlation across regions is 0.94 and is 0.91 for all data
cells jointly. Table 13 summarizes the correlations by region for the 25 areas with all 13 periods.
Table 13: Correlations CEX and S&MM by Metropolitan Area.
MSA Nond.Cons Dur.Cons Income
Washington, DC (PMSA) 0.926 0.660 0.973
Baltimore, MD (PMSA) 0.973 0.791 0.956
Atlanta, GA (MSA) 0.740 0.522 0.944
Miami, FL (CMSA) 0.533 0.399 0.922
Dallas, TX (CMSA) 0.939 0.839 0.917
Houston, TX (CMSA) 0.936 0.955 0.932
Los Angeles, CA (CMSA) 0.836 0.845 0.944
San Francisco, CA (CMSA) 0.921 0.797 0.981
San Diego, CA (MSA) 0.838 0.511 0.961
Portland, OR (CMSA) 0.989 0.932 0.973
Seattle, WA (CMSA) 0.928 0.841 0.935
Honolulu, HI (MSA) 0.858 0.409 0.956
Anchorage, AK (MSA) 0.931 0.601 0.847
New York, NY (CMSA) 0.952 0.727 0.957
Philadelphia, PA (CMSA) 0.812 0.698 0.932
Boston, MA (CMSA) 0.876 0.515 0.799
Pittsburgh, PA (MSA) 0.921 0.759 0.846
Chicago, IL (CMSA) 0.803 0.601 0.953
Detroit, MI (CMSA) 0.960 0.534 0.956
Milwaukee, WI (CMSA) 0.792 0.636 0.949
Minneapolis-St, Paul, MN (MSA) 0.940 0.863 0.972
Cleveland, OH (CMSA) 0.881 0.878 0.956
Cincinnati, OH (CMSA) 0.898 0.864 0.974
St. Louis, MO (MSA) 0.881 0.815 0.945
Kansas City, MO-KS (MSA) 0.958 0.708 0.961
Average 0.881 0.708 0.938
59Comparison with REIS Data Disposable income contains two important channels of insurance. It includes
income from ﬁnancial markets and the net income from government transfers and taxes. For consumption to fully
capture income smoothing, the income concept should exclude smoothing that takes place through ﬁnancial markets,
credit markets and through the federal tax and transfer system. The Regional Economic Information System (REIS)
of the BEA allows us to construct separate series for labor market income, ﬁnancial market income and net transfers
for each metropolitan area.













from the REIS. Table 14
shows that the correlation is generally high, but with a few exceptions (Miami, Cincinnati, Milwaukee). The average
correlation is 0.64. This imperfect correlation is due to a combination of measurement error in income and insurance
through ﬁnancial markets. The discrepancy warrants use of both income measures in the empirical analysis.
Table 14: Correlation Regional Disposable (S&MM) and Labor Income plus Transfers (REIS)
South and West Coeﬀ. Northeast and Midwest Corr.
Washington, DC (PMSA) 0.79 New York, NY (CMSA) 0.84
Baltimore, MD (PMSA) 0.42 Philadelphia, PA (CMSA) 0.82
Atlanta, GA (MSA) 0.73 Boston, MA (CMSA) 0.73
Miami, FL (CMSA) -0.18 Pittsburgh, PA (MSA) 0.57
Dallas, TX (CMSA) 0.63 Buﬀalo, NY (MSA) 0.77
Houston, TX (CMSA) 0.86 Chicago, IL (CMSA) 0.76
Los Angeles, CA (CMSA) 0.85 Detroit, MI (CMSA) 0.74
San Francisco, CA (CMSA) 0.65 Milwaukee, WI (CMSA) 0.12
San Diego, CA (MSA) 0.75 Minneapolis-St, Paul, MN (MSA) 0.70
Portland, OR (CMSA) 0.57 Cleveland, OH (CMSA) 0.90
Seattle, WA (CMSA) 0.60 Cincinnati, OH (CMSA) -0.23
Honolulu, HI (MSA) 0.84 St. Louis, MO (MSA) 0.54
Anchorage, AK (MSA) 0.80 Kansas City, MO-KS (MSA) 0.57
Phoenix, AZ (MSA) 0.83
Denver, CO (CMSA) 0.67 Average 0.64
60B Tables and Figures
T1 Mean St. Dev T2 Mean St. Dev. T3 Mean St.Dev.
RVW 12.3 20.3 RVW 12.3 20.3 RVW 12.3 20.3
S1B1 8.3 37.6 S1 20.4 41.8 Food 13.1 19.5
S1B2 14.0 37.2 S2 17.7 36.9 Beer 16.5 36.0
S1B3 18.0 35.6 S3 16.6 31.7 Smoke 15.2 23.7
S1B4 21.9 44.4 S4 16.2 30.3 Games 14.5 33.0
S1B5 22.4 37.3 S5 15.6 28.2 Books 14.2 29.8
S2B1 11.3 31.6 S6 15.2 26.9 Hshld 12.9 22.9
S2B2 16.2 29.7 S7 14.7 25.5 Clths 13.1 31.2
S2B3 17.9 30.2 S8 13.8 23.1 Hlth 14.7 22.1
S2B4 18.9 32.5 S9 13.2 19.2 Chems 13.3 25.0
S2B5 19.4 32.6 S10 11.7 22.8 Txtls 12.8 33.6
S3B1 12.8 29.9 B1 11.5 19.4 Cnstr 12.4 26.8
S3B2 15.7 27.6 B2 12.4 19.7 Steel 11.9 30.0
S3B3 16.8 26.7 B3 12.1 22.6 FabPr 12.8 26.3
S3B4 17.3 27.4 B4 11.9 22.3 ElcEq 14.7 31.8
S3B5 18.2 32.4 B5 13.9 23.2 Autos 15.7 35.0
S4B1 12.7 23.5 B6 13.7 24.5 Carry 14.7 31.7
S1B2 13.4 25.2 B7 14.6 26.8 Mines 11.0 27.2
S4B3 15.3 25.4 B8 16.4 28.8 Coal 12.6 28.7
S4B4 16.4 26.6 B9 17.5 32.6 Oil 13.4 22.7
S4B5 17.9 34.3 B10 17.2 33.4 Util 11.4 22.7
S5B1 11.9 21.1 M1 2.6 28.2 Telcm 11.7 20.2
S5B2 11.4 19.2 M2 7.8 25.4 Servs 17.4 37.5
S5B3 13.0 21.6 M3 8.0 22.4 BusEq 15.1 26.3
S5B4 13.7 25.1 M4 10.7 22.1 Paper 13.2 21.9
S5B5 15.5 33.2 M5 11.2 20.3 Trans 11.1 25.6
M6 12.0 20.0 Whlsl 12.2 30.8
M7 13.6 20.9 Rtail 14.1 25.7
M8 16.1 22.5 Meals 15.3 35.3
M9 18.2 24.5 Fin 13.7 24.4
M10 21.6 27.5 Other 11.8 29.4
Table 15: Annual Portfolio Returns 1926-2001. Time-series mean and standard deviation of portfolio returns in
excess of the one-year return on a one month T-bill. The ﬁrst three-columns are for the twenty-ﬁve size and book-to-market
portfolios. For comparison, the next six columns show returns on two other sets of test assets that are often used in cross-
sectional exercises. The ﬁrst one consists of ten size, ten book-to-market and ten momentum portfolios (T2). The momentum
portfolios measure winners and losers: Stocks that pay high returns in a given year and pay high returns in the subsequent year
are high momentum stocks. The last three columns are for thirty industry portfolios (T3). All data are from Kenneth French,
except the momentum portfolio returns which are from Chris Lundblad.
61Portfolio CCAPM Fama-French Collateral-CCAPM
RVW 2.00 -.40 .31
S1B1 8.11 3.75 -.46
S1B2 3.24 2.28 2.60
S1B3 -.65 -.85 -.44
S1B4 -5.58 -1.88 -.25
S1B5 -5.01 -2.59 -1.93
S2B1 5.48 2.19 3.31
S2B2 -.13 -.97 -1.36
S2B3 -2.96 -1.13 -1.29
S2B4 -2.88 -.95 .72
S2B5 -2.96 -.22 -1.85
S3B1 2.33 -1.24 1.42
S3B2 -.35 -1.10 -.46
S3B3 -1.42 -.50 -2.02
S3B4 -1.45 -.02 -1.74
S3B5 -2.65 1.21 .00
S4B1 1.39 -2.59 -.47
S1B2 1.05 .89 .99
S4B3 -.37 .19 -2.80
S4B4 -2.40 .42 -.10
S4B5 -3.33 -.67 -1.02
S5B1 2.11 -2.71 -1.26
S5B2 2.46 .46 1.18
S5B3 1.77 .27 .96
S5B4 .66 1.56 1.42
S5B5 -2.44 .60 .57





Table 16: Average Pricing Errors. Pricing errors from the Fama-MacBeth Regressions with aggregate pricing
factors. The set of returns is the value weighted market return and the 25 size and book-to-market portfolio returns.
The second column reports errors from the consumption CAPM, the third from the three-factor Fama-French model
and the last column reports average errors from the collateral CAPM with scaling variable myfa. The last two rows
report the square root of the average squared pricing errors and the Â
2 statistic for the null hypothesis that all pricing
errors are zero. The degrees of freedom are 25, 23 and 21 respectively. Two stars denote rejection of the hypothesis
at the 1 percent level.
Figure 8: Home-Ownership rate in the U.S.




























2Portfolio All States Good States Bad States
RVW .673 .432 1.056
S1B1 .796 1.509 -.334
S1B2 1.742 .543 3.642
S1B3 1.790 .729 3.472
S1B4 2.226 -.598 6.702
S1B5 2.037 .157 5.018
S2B1 1.464 .831 2.469
S2B2 1.383 .643 2.555
S2B3 1.244 -.018 3.244
S2B4 1.694 -.038 4.438
S2B5 1.547 .310 3.509
S3B1 1.220 .290 2.694
S3B2 1.225 .244 2.779
S3B3 1.065 .347 2.202
S3B4 1.288 .434 2.641
S3B5 1.343 .050 3.393
S4B1 .666 .340 1.181
S1B2 .996 .012 2.556
S4B3 .920 .493 1.596
S4B4 .922 -.283 2.831
S4B5 1.156 -.413 3.642
S5B1 .471 .613 .246
S5B2 .539 .330 .869
S5B3 .884 .389 1.670
S5B4 .894 .069 2.201
S5B5 .610 -.518 2.398
Table 17: Consumption Betas. Consumption betas are computed as ¯t = ¯c + ¯c:mymyt. Good states are states
where myfa is one standard deviation below zero and bad states are times where myfa is one standard deviation above zero.
The third and fourth column report the average consumption betas in good states and bad states respectively. Lettau and
Ludvigson (2001b) do the same exercise for their scaling variable, the consumption-wealth ratio.
˜ ¯0 ˜ ¯c ˜ ¯½ ˜ ¯my ˜ ¯my:c ˜ ¯my:½ R
2
1 5.50 .59 4.72
(3:05) (:38)
2 5.03 .72 1.16 5.17
(3:35) (:45) (3:45)
3 2.73 1.08 4.36 -.07 -.02 -.16 19.85
(3:62) (:51) (2:49) (:08) (:01) (:05)
4 3.69 .90 2.83 -.00 -.04 -.30 18.55
(2:70) (:29) (2:10) (:15) (:02) (:09)
5 2.90 1.07 4.14 .11 -.07 -.43 19.75
(2:87) (:28) (2:15) (:36) (:03) (:10)
Table 18: Time-Series Analysis for Aggregate Stock Market Return. The regression is: R
e;j





c∆logct+1 + ˜ ¯
j
½At∆log½t+1 + ˜ ¯
j
mymyt + ˜ ¯
j
my:cmyt∆logct+1 + ˜ ¯
j
my:½At∆log½t+1. The ﬁrst row just includes ∆log(ct+1).
The second row adds At∆log(½t+1). The last three rows add the interaction terms with myt. The scaling variable is mymo in
regression 3, myrw in regression 4, and myfa in regression 5. my is multiplied by 100. Data are for 1926-2001. Newey-West
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
63˜ ¸0 ˜ ¸c ˜ ¸½ ˜ ¸ˆ y ˜ ¸my:ˆ y ˜ ¸ˆ ½ ˜ ¸my:ˆ ½ R
2
1 4:70 2:49 :71 ¡2:36 ¡5:20 ¡:11 :33 65:6
mymo (4:10) (1:09) (:34) (2:37) (2:63) (:22) (:39) 54.7
[7:33] [1:98] [:63] [4:29] [4:81] [:41] [:71]
￿ :42 ¡:02 :07 ¡:24 :71 :52
2 5:53 1:94 :67 ¡2:17 ¡5:60 :22 :48 64:0
myrw (3:41) (1:06) (:29) (1:10) (2:27) (:42) (:63) 52.7
[6:29] [1:99] [:55] [2:09] [4:28] [:78] [1:19]
￿ :27 :49 ¡:07 ¡:22 ¡1:16 :87
3 4:38 2:08 :72 ¡3:00 ¡3:72 ¡:03 ¡:05 60:0
myfa (3:79) (1:10) (:29) (2:39) (3:88) (:45) (:87) 47.4
[6:71] [1:97] [:54] [4:25] [6:92] [:80] [1:56]
￿ :25 :51 ¡:33 ¡:07 1:76 ¡:44
Table 19: Cross-Sectional Results with Regional Asset Pricing Factors: Population-weighted data.
Results are for the iterative Fama-MacBeth procedure described in appendix with cutoﬀ level 0.9. The asset pricing factors


























tg is the sequence of unconstrained metropolitan regions. The average factors are population weighted, using
metropolitan data on the number of households. The variable with a hat denote deviations from the population-weighted
average. The coeﬃcient vector µ consists of °, Á, °¯1, ¡°¯2, Á¯1 and ¡Á¯2. The second column gives the zero-¯ return ˜ ¸0.
OLS standard errors are in parenthesis, Shanken (1992) corrected standard errors are in brackets. Row 1 is for mymo, row 2 for
myrw and row 3 for myfa. The set of test assets is T1. The period is 1952-2001, the longest period with metropolitan data.
˜ ¸0 ˜ ¸c ˜ ¸½ ˜ ¸ˆ y ˜ ¸my:ˆ y ˜ ¸ˆ ½ ˜ ¸my:ˆ ½ R
2
1 4:63 3:18 :82 ¡1:48 ¡4:40 ¡:15 :41 63:7
mymo (4:19) (1:28) (:37) (2:65) (2:91) (:24) (:43) 52.2
[8:10] [2:50] [:73] [5:18] [5:73] [:48] [:83]
￿ :53 ¡:07 :14 ¡:22 :11 :87
2 5:34 2:12 :70 ¡1:84 ¡4:91 :40 :79 63:0
myrw (3:46) (:99) (:28) (1:39) (1:94) (:44) (:63) 51.3
[6:43] [1:89] [:54] [2:63] [3:69] [:84] [1:19]
￿ :31 :54 ¡:07 ¡:22 ¡1:04 :83
3 4:87 2:82 :77 ¡2:43 ¡2:52 :03 :02 59:1
myfa (3:78) (1:30) (:30) (2:20) (3:79) (:44) (:85) 46.1
[6:88] [2:39] [:57] [4:02] [6:96] [:81] [1:55]
￿ :37 :37 ¡:32 ¡:06 1:74 ¡:44
Table 20: Cross-Sectional Results with Regional Asset Pricing Factors: Population-Weighted Data




are converted into aggregate (national) consumption units. They are multiplied by the ratio of the regional
non-durable price index to the population-weighted cross-region average non-durable price index (the regional real exchange
rate). This conversion is equivalent to converting the asset returns (expressed in national units) into regional consumption
units. The non-durable price index used is the food component of the CPI (1951-2001). Results are similar for the non-durables
component of the CPI, available only for 1967-2001 and are not reported.
64Figure 9: Regional variation in ratio of rent to food component of CPI.








































Figure 10: Power Spectral Density of Housing Collateral Ratio. The three lines are the cointegration
deviations between labor income and one of our three diﬀerent measures of housing collateral. For mymo, 92 percent of the
variance occurs at frequencies below ¼=10. For myrw that is 83 percent and for myfa 65 percent.



























Figure 11: Collateral Ratio and NBER Recession Dates.





















































65Figure 12: Response of the One-Year Excess Return to Impulse in Collateral Ratio mymo.
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